Northern Illinois University

Huskie Commons
Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations

Graduate Research & Artistry

2017

The swords of Damocles : explaining unconventional weapon
non-use in modern war
Martin Claar

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations

Recommended Citation
Claar, Martin, "The swords of Damocles : explaining unconventional weapon non-use in modern war"
(2017). Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations. 6330.
https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/allgraduate-thesesdissertations/6330

This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Research & Artistry at Huskie
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Research Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Huskie Commons. For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

ABSTRACT

THE SWORDS OF DAMOCLES: EXPLAINING UNCONVENTIONAL WEAPON NON-USE
IN MODERN WAR

Martin Claar, Ph.D.
Department of Political Science
Northern Illinois University, 2017
Andrea Radasanu, Director

This dissertation investigates the logic for unconventional weapon non-use during wars in
the 20th Century. International relations scholarship has offered two primary explanatory factors
for the non-use of radiological, biological and chemical weapons: either it is a result of power
concerns and utility or due to adherence to taboo norms. However, these logics are insufficient
in explaining oscillations in policy, near misses and instances of actual use. Thus, I argue that
normative concerns based on the rules of war as associated with Just War theory impact the
decisions concerning unconventional weapons. Consideration of the discriminatory and
proportionality norms associated with Just War theory best reflect why states with opportunity
and motive would abstain from use, while instances of supreme emergency would explain a
state’s use policies or narrow misses.
To test this explanation, a series of case studies will examined involving the only state to
ever use both chemical and nuclear weapons – the United States. Using primary decisionmaking documents, supplemented with secondary historical sources, the motivation for U.S.
policies should be apparent. Afterward, considerations of applicability to other cases or new
weapons technology will be considered.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the
slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident or miscalculation or by
madness.
~ John F. Kennedy, Address before the UN General Assembly, Sept. 25, 1961

War is the impetus for many things in human relations. Chief among those things is the
development and refinement of new technologies through which to pursue victory. Each new
war against a new enemy brings the opportunity for new weapons, tactics and means of claiming
victory. From the days of the caveman swinging a club to modern warfare’s weapons of mass
destruction, man has sought to create better means of securing himself and his livelihood.
Nowhere is this truer than today when it has become even more imperative given the rapidity of
advancements in weapons and tools of warfare. As Britain’s Air Commodore during the World
War era Sir Frank Whittle put it, “A nation’s ability to fight a modern war is only as good as its
technological ability.”1

“Conflict Scientists – Frank Whittle,” Military History Monthly, 12 February 2015. Available at
https://www.military-history.org/articles/conflict-scientists-frank-whittle.htm [Accessed 20 May 2017].
1
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Weapons of mass destruction or unconventional weapons represent the pinnacle of this
rapid advancement of weaponry in modern warfare. These particular armaments are unlike any
other bomb, bullet or grenade. Capable of devastating armies in a single use or leveling whole
cities, unconventional weapons in the form of biological, chemical or radiological agents present
their owners with particularly strong means of protecting oneself. Each category of
unconventional weapon has been used in modern war at least once and have proven their
destructive capacities. From mustard and phosgene gases during World War I to the use of
atomic bombs in World War II, the international community has experienced exactly what these
weapons are capable of. But after these first uses, unconventional weapons have largely been
avoided as a tool of war. Atomic weapons have not been used since World War II, while
chemical and biological weapons have made only sparing appearances in wars since World War
I and have not been well received by the international community when they are used. As such,
one must ask why if they provided such incomparable advantages to their users.
One possible explanation to this puzzle is that with advancements and experience with
this new technology comes the resulting questions of legitimacy and morality. We question how
the world views our new technology and if we can legitimately use it in future wars. We wonder
if we have gone one step too far. We ask ourselves if we have created the weapon that will end
civilization. Arthur C. Clarke captures this idea best in his book Voices from the Sky. There he
says, “As our own species is in the process of proving, one cannot have superior science and
inferior morals. The combination is unstable and self-destroying.”2

2

Arthur C. Clarke, Voices from the Sky (New York: Pocket Books, 1980).
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Ultimately, we have to judge whether these tools of war fulfilled their promise without
compromising our humanity in the process. That is the juxtaposition that world leaders find
themselves in when determining whether to utilize these unconventional weapons during future
wars. A rational and prudential comparison of the utility of the weapons as per prior experience
must be measured against the world’s moral compass where those weapons are concerned. It is
these explanations which seem to be at the heart of the argument about why modern states have
abstained from utilizing unconventional weapons during the 20th Century.

Experiencing Unconventional Weapons

Before going further, I want to provide the readers with a pair of thought experiments. It
is a safe assumption that individuals reading this will have never personally experienced the use
of gas or radiological armaments, given the trend of non-use of unconventional weapons that has
developed during the 20th century. While chemical weapon use has been experienced as recently
as 2017 in the Syrian civil war and the fear of nuclear warfare with North Korea loom over the
world, the effects of these weapons may still be largely a mystery to the lay person. As such, I
want to task the reader to put themselves in the shoes of a soldier, experiencing these weapons.
Imagine first being on the battlefield on a bright day. Then chlorine gas is released, a
great green cloud forming in front of your very eyes. Suddenly, the air is filled with screams and
your field of vision is obstructed. Gunfire begins erratically, not aimed at anything. Choking
and screaming continue but slowly cease. So does the gunfire. Fifteen minutes passes, then a
half hour. The sounds of gunfire and screaming stop. An hour passes and your field of vision is
now clear, as is the enemy unit who just had chlorine gas used against them and everything else
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that was between you and them. Dead men and animals litter the battlefield, the men holding
their throats or faces. All are dead from asphyxiation. A half mile of death stretches before you
and you stand in awe at the destruction you have just wrought upon your enemies.
Next imagine experiencing what would otherwise be a normal day as a soldier. You are a
mile away from the main encampment at a medical outpost. The day is beautiful, warm and
cloudless. You see a plane fly overhead and then see a blinding flash from the main
encampment’s direction. At first, you are confused by the light and just as quickly it disappears.
Then so do the shadows that had previously been visible on the wall. A dark haze and swirling
dust blow toward you at an extreme pace. The building you were starts to shake and fall apart.
You quickly exit the building you were in and see that everything in the direction of the flash has
been completely leveled. In the epicenter is a massive crater and flames. The people who were
there are either completely destroyed or aflame and dying. Even as close a few hundred feet
away are injured individuals. You are one of the lucky ones to get to walk away; for many, the
chance of escape never existed.
Let me tell you now – these were real experiences. The former story is that of Willi
Siebert, a German soldier who witnessed the first use of chlorine gas at Ypres.3 The latter was
the story of Michihiko Hachiya, the Director of the Hiroshima Communications Hospital who
survived the dropping of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.4 If you put yourself in their shoes, if
you imagine the things they saw, then the agreement to seek restraint for unconventional

Chemical & Engineering News, “100 Year of Chemical Weapons: First Hand Accounts of the First Chlorine Gas
Attack” (2015). Available at http://www.chemicalweapons.cenmag.org/first-hand-accounts-of-the-first-chlorinegas-attack/ [Accessed 2 April 2016].
3

Michihiko Hachiya, Hiroshima Diary: The Journal of a Japanese Physician, August 6 – September 30, 1945
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
4
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weapons use makes perfect sense. These experiences were traumatizing at best and the last
things some individuals experienced at worst. The real question then is this: on what ground
have they been restrained and how permanent is that restraint?

Definitions

Before going further, several key terms for future chapters require precise definitions.
These terms are war, unconventional weapons, norms, the logic of appropriateness and the logic
of consequences.
War hereafter will refer strictly to interstate wars, where interstate wars will be defined
using the Correlates of War project’s definition. War then is a violent conflict occurring between
one or more officially recognized states whereby 1,000 total battledeaths occur over the course
of the conflict. Moreover, for an action to take place “in war” means that the action in question
occurs between the official first date where war is declared and the official final date where war
is formally terminated.5
Next, it is important to understand what an “unconventional weapon” is within the 20th
century context under investigation. Unconventional weapons are weapons which are not a
common part of a state’s arsenal of material capabilities. Not every state has these weapons, nor
in great quantities, save for a few major powers. Moreover, these weapons are not simply
explosive devices or bullets, but add some element beyond what can be commonly achieved an
ordinary individual or state. Unconventional weapons take one of three forms: radiological,

5

Meredith Sarkees and Frank Wayman, Resort to War: 1816-2007 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2010). Available at
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war [Accessed 5 May 2015].
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biological or chemical. Radiological weapons (RW) refer to any of a subset of weapons which
makes use of nuclear material in the form of fission or fusion explosives. These may refined, as
was the case with the atomic bomb and subsequent developments of tactical nuclear arms, or
unrefined, also known as a “dirty bomb.” Radiological weapons result in more than simply a
larger than normal explosion; they also disperse nuclear elements in a wide radius, rendering
entire areas uninhabitable. Biological weapons (BW) are any of a subset of weapons in which
bacteriological or pathological agents has been infused so as to increase killing effectiveness.
Examples of this class of weapons includes weaponized versions of anthrax, smallpox, botulism
toxin, and even the bubonic plague. Relatedly, chemical weapons (CW) refer to a subset of
weapons in which chemical agents of a flammable, choking or blinding nature are utilized to
cause bring about extra lethality. Examples of this type of weapon include, but are not limited
to, sarin gas, mustard gas, napalm and Agent Orange. Biological and chemical weapons,
sometimes referred to as bio-chemical weapons (CBW) hereafter, may be dispersed either via
explosives, aerosols or liquids.6
This class of weaponry that is noted as “unconventional” should be compared to that
which is deemed conventional. Conventional weapons include but are not limited to high
explosives, flammable or incendiary agents, propelled bullets and smart bombs. These weapons
systems require little to no special skills to create or use, as compared to the scientific and
technological advancements that are necessary for the creation and utilization of so-called
unconventional weapons. Moreover, conventional weapons as listed above are common stock

6

R. Everett Langford, Introduction to Weapons of Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and Biological
(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & Sons Inc., 2004): 1-3.
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within modern arsenals, whereas unconventional weapons are rarer. For the purposes of this
investigation, weapons such as teargas and napalm, while technically being chemical agents, are
deemed as conventional weapons. As such, their use does not indicate that unconventional
weapons have been used in a war.

Chapter Plan

To study the oscillations in the phenomenon of unconventional weapon non-use, a twostep approach will be utilized. The first phase of the investigation in Chapter 2 will be a
theoretical and philosophical attempt to understand the competing logics of non-use. By delving
into the commonly associated international relations explanations of utility, deterrence, and
absolute normative prohibition, any faults or important clues as to their influence on non-use can
be identified for later testing. Also, these critiques will help in building my own alternative
explanation that grounded in the Just War tradition. I intend to propose that utilizing the Just
War norms of proportionality, target discrimination, and last resort reflects the oscillations in
unconventional weapon policies better than the common international relations explanations.
However, simply providing a philosophical and theoretical discussion of why non-use
might occur is not enough. The second step is to test the logics of non-use against the historical
record. This will take permit me to look at both the origins of unconventional weapon restraint
as well as continued restraint in war. Chapters 3 and 4 will focus on the “origins” cases for
CBW non-use considering World War I and nuclear non-use in light of World War II. Chapters
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5 will look at the development of the non-use logics in the Korean War. By investigating the
U.S.’s use, non-use or near use of unconventional weapons in the Korean, it should become
apparent what role history, experience and circumstance play in developing and applying the
logics of non-use. It will also help to determine if national self-interest or a concern for the rules
of war weigh heavier on the decision-makers.
Finally, Chapter 6 will conclude the study by making the case that the proposed logic of
non-use rooted in Just War norms provides the best explanation of the trends in the phenomenon
of unconventional weapon non-use as a whole, instead of weapon by weapon. Considerations of
proportionality, discrimination and exigent circumstance can provide a better understanding of
the policy changes due to their dynamic natures, as opposed to the more static common
international relations explanations of utility, deterrence, and absolute prohibition. After doing
this, new avenues of research will be introduced. These future research questions include: what
other Just War norms have an impact on how war is started and pursued; what other weapons
may require consultation and ultimately may become classified as “unconventional” or
“unusable” per the Just War logic of non-use; and whether these logics of non-use are universal
in nature or if some entities may be able to bend or break them. Short discussions of each of
these future projects will be presented.

Contributions

This question is an important one for several reasons. First, it seeks to supply an
alternative understanding of war that is grounded in reality and human understanding as complex
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constructs developed over time; man is not simply a static being. As such, theories explaining
interaction should not be static either, which is a long-standing fault with the Realist paradigm.
Second, it helps to propel the age-old Just War tradition into the 21st century in a practical
and pragmatic manner. With the resurgence of international focus on what is appropriate
according to world standards, the question of what rules govern war-making comes to the
forefront. Just War in conjunction with norm development may provide the necessary
framework for understanding restraint in modern war.
Third, this thesis provides something that dominant Constructivist theory is largely
lacking: a source for the norms it studies. Most Constructivist research does not group norms
into a family. It breaks them into separate, unconnected ideas of appropriateness (ie. the nuclear
taboo and the norms against bio-chemical weapons use are two separate and unrelated entities in
Constructivist literature). This is done because moving beyond the first instance of the norm’s
existence and the action(s) that caused it are empirically difficult to do. However, to treat
normative studies in such a manner is to miss the common logic that underlies each norm. It is
my contention that all norms of war can be traced back to some abstract set of rules, of which
Just War may be the best framework for prudential rules of war.
Finally, in depth investigations of historical cases may provide new ideas about how
decision-makers think about weapons of mass destruction. Instead of seeing states as unitary,
rational and self-interested, these historical investigations may let us see that states are humanrun entities that develop over time and are concerned with the approbation of others. Showing
this may alter how states’ leaderships view each and interact in future interactions.

CHAPTER 2
LOGICS OF NON-USE

Because, therefore, we are defending a way of life, we must be respectful of that way of life as we
proceed to the solution of our problem. We must not violate its principles and its precepts, and
we must not destroy from within what we are trying to defend from without.
~ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Speech before NATO Council, 26 November 1951

International relations scholarship to date has offered several explanations as to why
unconventional arms are not used in modern warfare. Those from the Realist and Constructivist
paradigms especially have been fascinated with the logics of use and non-use where nuclear,
chemical and biological agents are concerned. Consideration is given to the consequences of use
and how the international community will react, to the usefulness that the weapon will serve in
expediting victory, and to the role that taboos have played in polarizing states’ opinions of the
weapons themselves. However, all three focal points provided by the paradigms have
limitations, either in their internal logics or in their accuracy when compared to the historical
record. Thus, something different must be occurring that would limit the wartime use of
unconventional weapons.
Based on this, I assert that a non-paradigmatic answer is necessary to understand the
logics of unconventional weapons decision-making. It is my contention that a return to the Just
War tradition is necessary. It provides elements of both dominant paradigms without eliminating
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the considerations of either norms or power relations while providing a more historically
accurate understanding of actual decision-making. Specifically, a focus the jus in bello rules of
warfare gives a better window in the minds of decision-makers where unconventional weapons
are concerned. Rules concerning proper targets and the proportionality of means to ends are
more reflective of the history in a way that focusing on probationary norms, weapons utility and
the consequences of actions do not capture. This chapter will introduce the paradigmatic logics,
their faults and then my own explanation for unconventional weapons decision-making.

The Problems with Utilitarianism, Consequentialism, and Taboo Norms

Two paradigms have dominated the discussion of unconventional weapons – Realism and
Constructivism. They assert wildly different things despite investigating the same historical
instances. The former tells us that unconventional weapons are power and that is the way to
achieve security via expedited victory or the threat of deterrence and mutually assured
destruction; the latter say that unconventional weapons are prohibited by a world-level taboo
defining them as immoral. They become associated with three logics for explaining non-use.
Loosely, these three explanations can be summarized as the logics of consequences, utility and
absolute norms. But what does each predict and why?
Structural Realism generally explains that the decisions states make at the international
level are the result of three things working in conjunction: an anarchic system, a rational drive to
survive, and the distribution of power within the system. Given that there is no world
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government with the ability to adjudicate and mitigate conflicts between sovereign entities, states
are left in a system of self-help. It is up to each sovereign to best care for his or her state’s
survival. To do this effectively, both material and latent power capacities are necessary but these
capacities are not universal but rather distributed unequally throughout the system of states; it is
power then that differentiates states and determines their chances of survival. Among the
material capacities then are included weapons of a nuclear, chemical or biological nature. These
are the strongest weapons in a state’s arsenal and the ones which can most impact their decisions
in warfare tactics. But these impacts can be summarized into two real effects: either a state will
make decisions about these weapons through either the logic of utility or of consequences and
deterrence.1
An argument from the utility perspective would tell us that “War is cruelty.” Further,
“There is no use trying to reform it. The crueler it is, the sooner it will be over.”2 This assumes
that states are rational utilitarian actors which seek to advance their security through whatever
means are necessary. If war is a means of surviving and one has the power to achieve this end,
then there is no reason to show restraint. From this calculation, a state will rationally determine
how quickly and effectively they can end a war or achieve victory if they employ weapons of an
unconventional nature. Most states should conclude that limits and rules do not matter;

1

For a discussion of Structural Realism, see John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York:
Norton, 2001); Randall Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo Basis: What Security Dilemma?” Security Studies,
Vol 5 (Spring 1996): 90-121; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press,
1979).
2

William Tecumseh Sherman, Memoirs of General William Tecumseh Sherman, Vol. 2 (New York: Applewood
Books, 2008): 92.
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therefore, one should use whatever force is needed so long as the outcome will not be negative
for the acting state. The calculus here is as follows
𝑛

𝐸𝑈 = ∑ 𝐷𝑖 𝑃𝑖
𝑖=1

where the expected utility EU is based on the calculus of the desired outcome or utility D of
some action as compared to the probability P that the action will occur. It is the actions that
result in maximum expected utility that will be chosen, while those with high risks or low
probabilities of success will be avoided.3 Given that states are rational maximizers, it is apparent
why structural realists and the logic of utility would propose this approach for understanding
conflict.
From a more practical standpoint, this requires a consideration of power differentials and
strategic opportunity to determine which actions will result in the maximum utility for the acting
party. This means that two instances of use should be apparent for decision-makers approaching
unconventional weapons from a utility perspective: expediting victory in an asymmetric war and
seeking to minimize losses in a symmetric war. In both cases, it would be strategically
advantageous to minimize the chance of a prolonged conventional conflict while ensuring
victory by utilizing unconventional weapons as early and as often as possible. Restraint then
would come from a non-beneficial calculus, whereby unconventional weapon use either has no

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “An Expected Utility Theory of International Conflict,” American Political Science
Review, Vol. 74, No. 4 (December 1980): 917-931.
3
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strategic value, does not expedite victory, or will result in greater losses on other wartime fronts.4
This should result in restraint where unconventional weapons are concerned from a utility
perspective.
At heart here is the fact that rules do not determine the best course of action, if Realists
are correct. All decisions should boil down to survival based on power differentials and the costs
or benefits of certain actions. Rules are only followed so long as there is no significant cost to
the acting state, and broken without regret as soon as the actor needs to.5 But the historical
record does not defend such a view. Major powers involved in wars with lesser powers have
largely restrained themselves from unconventional weapon use, even if the war was protracted
and the costs in terms of lives and finances increased. Coincidentally, unconventional use is at
its greatest when faced with a great power threat. Moreover, when engaged in asymmetric
warfare, major powers use unconventional arms less. This is a real problem for utility logics,
especially when Gaddis frames the problem like this:
…[A]ssume counterfactually that… Country X had gained exclusive control over what
seemed, as first glance, to be an ‘absolute’ weapon… [W]ould one not regard X as very
likely, if it should ever get into another military conflict at whatever level, to use its new
instrument of warfare to ensure victory as long as there was no realistic prospect of
retaliation by Y or anyone else? Abstraction suggests that [this] should have happened
during the period in which the United States enjoyed an effective nuclear monopoly. The
fact that in reality [it did not] requires explanation.6

4

Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1984): 59-79; Kenneth Waltz,
“More May Be Better,” in Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: W.W. Norton, 2012): 145.
5

Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, A Theory of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

6

John Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997): 88.

15
As such, utility-based decision-making that considers differences in power scale cannot be the
primary consideration for unconventional weapon decision-making.
Alternatively, some Realists argue that the consequences of use are what truly impacts
decision-making. Generally, this perspective is identified with deterrence theory, which also
begins with the assumption that states are rational utilitarian actors. The difference here is the
degree of risk associated with actions under consideration, given the advent of nuclear weaponry.
A state’s primary consideration here is not simply how quickly the war can be ended but how
others will react. Acting states must take into account what the opponent and their allies can do
if unconventional weapons are used.7 When facing opponents who hold similar massive
retaliatory weapon capacities or who are allies of weak enemies, a sovereign should think twice
before using unconventional weapons lest they face a return fire in kind. The fear here is of a
second strike capacity or mutually assured destruction.8 To put it bluntly, the logic is that “he
who shoots first dies second.” These weapons become threats and bargaining chips with which
to exact victory while not actually using them. As Schelling puts it, “War appears to be, or
threatens to be, not so much a contest of strength as one of endurance, nerve, obstinacy and
pain… not so much a contest of military strength as a bargaining process.”9 Typically, this sort
of logic is most associated with nuclear deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction

Susan B. Martin, ‘Realism and Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Consequentialist Analysis’ in Ethics and
Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives, eds. Sohail H Hashmi and Steven P. Lee (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 16-42.
7

8

Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2004): 27-29; Adam Lowther, Deterrence: Rising
Powers, Rogue Regimes, and Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012): 1-11;
Glenn Snyder, “The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror,” in The Balance of Power, ed. Paul Seabury (San
Francisco: Chandler, 1965): 184-201.
9

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New York: Yale University Press, 2008): 7.
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during the Cold War, though some scholars have sought to apply it to CBWs as well. But here,
too, the historical record does not bear out the theory. While mutually assured destructive logics
do show up in some of the records, it is not the only (or even primary) point of contention for
decision-makers. Moreover, use or very near misses of unconventional weapons have occurred
even when faced with a deterrence policy.10 Thus, logics of consequence cannot be the sole
source of non-use either.
Based on the discrepancies between the Structural Realist logics and historical records, a
third explanation was proposed by the Social Constructivist paradigm – namely that there are
taboos against the use of unconventional weapons. Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald propose
that there are two separate and distinct absolute norms that restrain states from using CBWs and
nuclear weapons, regardless of utility or consequences.11 For CBWs, Price says that the absolute
norm came into existence even before the weapons were ever developed. The inhumane nature
of the theorized weapons was enough to get most of the world to agree to a prohibition on use,
with exception to the U.S. and Britain. Despite this, widespread use occurred in World War I
due to the latency of the norm but these experiences polarized the social environment and
solidified the CBW non-use norm.12 In the case of nuclear weapons, Tannenwald argues that it
took experiencing use of such weapons during World War II before a norm came into existence;

10

See James Morrow, Order Within Anarchy: The Laws of War as an International Institution (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014) and T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2009).
Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboo,” in
Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1996): 114-152.
11

Richard Price, The Chemical Weapons Taboo (New York: Cornell University Press, 2007); Richard Price, “The
Shadow of Ypres: How a whole class of weaponry came to be seen as indecent,” Economist, 31 August 2013.
12
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prior to this, nuclear weapons were just considered to be large-scale bombs without any intrinsic
differences from conventional explosives.13 It is important to note that because of the difference
in origin stories, Price and Tannenwald treat these two taboos as being distinct and wholly
separate from one another, despite their similar developmental trajectory and wording. In both
cases, the result of experience was a moral and social disapprobation by the community of states
and especially the U.S. It took the community of states experiencing and determining the
appropriateness of these weapons for actors to avoid their use in future conflicts. Over time,
these two norms have become strong enough to be considered taboos or absolute moral
imperatives which permanently ban the use of WMDs. Numerous treaties have subsequently
formalized the imperative and the majority of states in the international community have ratified
these treaties, reinforcing the social disapprobation of the weapons in question. Thus, Price and
Tannenwald both argue that there is roughly a zero percent chance of WMD use of any variety
occurring in the future.
Unfortunately, the historical record does not bear this out. Mobilization, serious
consideration, in-depth planning and even CBW use have occurred since the points where Price
and Tannenwald say that the norms should have taken hold for decision-makers. Nuclear tests
have occurred and the number of nuclear players in the world has increased. Price had even
gone so far to as to say that Syria would never break the CBW taboo in 2013; his prediction
failed to come true, however, given that several instances of CBW use have occurred during the
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Syrian civil war.14 This points to a further problem with the dominant Constructivist taboo
literature: how long does it take for a taboo to come into existence and upon whom is it binding
upon? These are questions and cases which taboo Constructivists struggle to deal with. Thus, if
the logics of utility, consequences, and absolute norms cannot explain the historical record, what
can explain the oscillations on unconventional weapon use during the 20th century?

The Just War Tradition Alternative

I contend that, as opposed to using the more static logics of utility, deterrence or absolute
prohibitionary norms. We need to move away from paradigms which prescribe absolute answers
representing the two ends of the foreign policy spectrum: either that rules do not matter or that
rules are absolutely obeyed. We need to examine the possibility that use and non-use are the
result of something more dynamic, revolving for goals, knowledge, and the changing
circumstances of war itself, which can account for the oscillations in policy resulting in both use
and non-use as well as the rhetoric of decision-makers. This alternative theory must account for
mankind’s drive to survive as well as its propensity to follow established rules assuming the
normality of circumstances. For these reasons, it is my position that Just War logics meet these
requirements and best reflect the reality of decision-making. The Just War tradition has
undergone several iterations, from that of Catholic absolutism to something more akin to Realist
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utilitarianism.15 But one such iteration, the war convention developed by individuals such as
Michael Walzer, Bruno Coppetiers and Nicholas Fotion, may provide a foothold from which one
can explain these disparate findings that utility, deterrence and absolutism cannot adequately
explain.
It is true to say that war is a violent interaction between men with opposing views or
goals that normally results in death and destruction. That is simply the nature of warfare.
However, three other facts about war are true. First, wars are not the status quo for human
relations. We are not always conflictual with one another; more often than not, we are peaceful
and seek this as our ends in human interactions, even where conflict is occurring. Violence,
killing, and harmful interactions are not the norm in terms of social interactions. They are a
rarity and something which most people seek to avoid, as violent interactions have a high
likelihood of ending one’s life.16 The same can be said of warfare on an international scale.
Most conflicts of interest end well before the bullets begin to fly. War is thought of a last resort,
an action to be avoided because of its destructive and costly nature.17 Thus, wars are abnormal
interactions and even last resorts in international policy, given the costs accrued by all sides
involved.
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Secondly, when wars do occur, they rarely end in a decisive victory by any one side or
state. In fact, wars rarely have decisive or absolute victories as a goal. Where instances of
murder or self-defense on an individual level result in a finite end to one party, wars on the
international level almost never have the same definitive result. States rarely cease to exist; their
citizens live on. Instead of absolute victory and unconditional surrender, most wars are aimed at
and result in a return to the pre-existing status quo. The same actors who began the war maintain
their sovereignty afterward.18 So the question is why this occurs when war does happen? Why
do suboptimal outcomes become the common result?
The answer as to why war rarely reaches these levels of victory and destruction is the
third fact of warfare – wars are governed by natural rules applied to specific circumstances
which mitigate the chances of absolute destruction or victory from occurring. Predating the
formalization of international relations paradigms, attribution of war-time action revolved around
an understanding of the war convention or the rules of war; these were unwritten rules describing
permissible and legitimate acts on could take during conflict.19 Philosophically, this is the line of
argumentation presented by Just War theorists – that war has a set of limits which are applied to
actions to determine how to legitimately prosecute conflictual interactions on an international
level. Typically, these rules are abstractions necessitating application to real-world issues to
determine appropriate courses of action. These abstract rules are universal, bound in the
prudential functions of every actor involved in decision-making. Decision-makers, military men,
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and civilians alike understand and debate the applicability of these rules to more finite policy
choices, but they utilize a similar language and logic in doing so. It is that logic which governs
the decision-making process and requires further explanation, as I would assert these debates and
rules are the source of restraint where unconventional weapons are concerned.
According to most formulations of Just War, these rules are broken into three categories:
jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. Ad bellum rules define who may declare war and
under what conditions war may be reasonably just in declaring; post bellum rules define how the
two sides treat each other after war has ceased such that peace may be returned to in a quick and
orderly manner.20 While it is fair to say that the steps leading up to war and the steps resulting in
a return to status quo relations are of both moral and logistical importance to states, it is not these
aspects which describe wartime decision-making and prosecution. Instead, the focus moving
forward will be on the jus in bello guidelines. The norms associated with jus in bello make up
the war convention and determine how one conducts the war once it is entered into, making them
of paramount importance to this project.
Thus, let’s expand the category of jus in bello rules so that each aspect traditionally
associated with it may become clear. Jus in bello prudential rules can be subdivided into two
norms of importance: the differentiation of targets versus non-targets and the use of proportional
force for the achievement of war goals.21 It is on the consideration of these Just War logics which
I seek to use in explaining the tradition of unconventional weapon non-use.
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Combatants and Non-Combatants

As previously stated, violent interaction is not the norm for human social interaction.
Most people are unwilling to kill one another on a day to day basis. However, when the rare
instance of war is occurring, one automatically sees a loosening of the typical prohibition against
killing. It is recognized that this is the immediate effect of warfare – death. Those charged with
the pursuit of national goals, identified as combatants or soldiers, are given equal license to cause
injurious harm or even death to their opponents of the same identity. The logic here is that to
defend one’s country, a soldier must seek to eliminate those who wish to directly cause that harm
and threaten both the country and the soldier.22 The defense of self, of non-combatants or
civilians, and of the nation as a whole necessitates that some killing being permissible. But are
there individuals who are off limits or can anyone become a legitimate target?
From a strategic standpoint, the surest means of securing one’s interests and personal
wellbeing is to eliminate any and all who are identified as members of the opposing entity. This
would include civilians, individuals who are not partaking of wartime activities but instead
remain in the status quo of peaceful relations. This calculation of what it takes to be truly secure
is the optimal rational outcome – if there are no enemies left in existence, one can face no
threats. And while this type of targeting does occur on occasion throughout history, its use is
rare and typically associated with negative reactions from others in the world community. 23
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Modern genocides, salting the earth with the blood of one’s enemies, and watching Rome burn
are all examples of targeting of all possible enemies regardless of wartime participation status.
While these words conjure up the images of the atrocities of warfare, it is again important to note
that they are far from common place. They are largely the exception to the normal modus
operandi approaches to warfare and victory, namely that war is about forcing one’s opponent
into submission and not eliminating them from the earth altogether. Whether it be a whole
state’s populace or the fraction therein who support the opposing side, it has been rare for such
widespread killing to occur historically.
If it is the case that war seeks to cause opponents to submit but not eradicate one’s
enemies altogether, then it must also be the case that those who undertake a policy of war seek to
limit the number and type of casualties caused. Policy-makers know that war will mean death
for some, but it is generally assumed that those who will die are those who participate in combat.
Soldiers are given equal right to defend themselves and to kill in order to do so. This is an
extension of the reason of war logic, which permits those about to be harmed to do things they
otherwise would not do given a state of peace. But not all those who find themselves caught on
the battlefield seek to do harm, thus necessitating a clarification for the reason of war, namely
that there are classes of individuals of which some may be harmed while others must remain
unharmed when possible. It is here that the distinction between combatants and non-combatants
lies. Non-combatants are those individuals who are pursuing their daily lives, posing no threat or
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meaning no harm to participants of war.24 Given that they seek to cause no harm, the reason of
war cannot extend to permit them being killed by soldiers or tactics directly.
Thus the goal of wartime actions should not be to harm those who wish to do no harm to
others; instead policy makers are limited to targeting those would cause harm. Now, this is not
to say that non-combatants may not die during warfare, simply that they should not be the targets
of military actions. Certain tactics or weapons may cause collateral damage and harm innocent
individuals. Doing so would not necessarily delegitimize the actions, weapons or tactics of a
participant of war. There are times where even the best laid plans fall apart and cause harm to
non-combatants. While this can lead one to question the legitimacy of the course of action, the
action may still be legitimate if the goal was not to directly cause harm to those non-soldiers.
However, these judgments are largely ex post facto and require researchers and historians to
examine the motivations and goals of a wartime action. On the other hand, giving this leeway
does not open the door for mass civilian casualties as a side effect of war. States should and do
seek to limit the number of noncombatants harmed by choosing military targets, using precision
arms, and limited engagement techniques.25
Based on this discrimination criterion, a consideration of who may be harmed by certain
actions or weapons may be enough to explain the limited use of unconventional weapon use
against large civilian populations in some cases. Their large blast ranges, nuclear fallout, and
potential to spread among populaces result in a lack of discrimination between combatants and
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noncombatants. However, it cannot explain all cases of use and non-use of unconventional
weapons, especially where the sole case of nuclear weapons use is concerned. Simple
consideration of targets must play a supporting role to a more encompassing norm within the war
convention – that of proportionality.

Proportional Means

The just war tradition goes beyond discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate
targets. A second, more abstract but widely applicable concept is also at work in the calculus of
wartime decision-making for states and their leaders – the rule of proportionality. As it is
usually described, the rule of proportionality dictates that a state’s means must be proportional to
the ends which they seek to achieve.26 Stated thus, it appears that anything is a viable wartime
option. Since war is always a threat of death and the costs are vast, one might assume that
anything which expedites or ensures victory with minimal losses would be legitimate. However,
that is simply a calculation of utility, which it has already been determined is not the way in
which states make decisions. Instead, the rule of proportionality rightly used makes certain
tactics or weapons unconventional or illegitimate, thereby restraining a state or leader from
utilizing them despite the utility that they may bring. The question is how does this work?
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To calculate the rule of proportionality, several factors must be known. Those factors
include: (1) the type of threat being faced; (2) the actor’s goal in waging war; and (3) the effects
of the weapon or tactic being considered to achieve the goal. Each of these measures requires
explanation to make them operable to a decision-maker, as well as to a researcher investigating
their applicability in decision-making. Given these parameters, let us elaborate each step, which
will be useful later in examining real world decision-making.
Actors face a variety of threats. States may face a loss of reputation, monetary gain,
territorial ownership, populace control, or military superiority. The possibilities are vast. Enemy
combatants may simply be seeking to remove a colonial power from controlling their otherwise
independent territory. They may be seeking legitimacy in the international arena or resources
that may be needed. Depending on what type of conflict of interest one faces, war may not even
be the appropriate response. As previously stated, most conflicts of interest can be dealt with
through non-violent or less violent means than war, making war a highly abnormal occurrence.
But when faced with a threat to something important to the acting state, war may be deemed a
viable option.27
If that is so, if the threat is great enough or important enough, then it falls to the actor to
determine what goals to pursue based on the threat posed. This determines the ends desired by
the acting state. Is it to maintain territorial control? To gain resources, reputation or legitimacy?
In most cases, the goal of an acting state is to maintain the status quo of relations prior to war. A
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return to peaceful relations via limitations to the degree of conflict is key to a successful
resumption of peace.28 To quote Montesquieu, states at war will seek to do “the least ill possible,
without harming their true interests.”29 Excessive force can result in prolonged conflict or
recurrent conflict, both of which can be costlier than using only that force which is necessary for
achieving one’s goals.
As a result of a determination of ends desired or threat faced, states may then determine
what degree of “ill” is necessary to cause to one’s opponents in order to return to the status quo
of peace. It is here that policy prescriptions and knowledge of one’s weapons, tactics, and
military capacities becomes important. States rarely if ever estimate that their true interest will
require absolute victory or mass slaughter.30 Most states assume that victory can be achieved
through conventional or limited means. Conventional weapons, such as standard issue guns,
tanks, aircraft bombardments with typical explosives, or sea-to-land fired missiles are usually
enough to secure the desired ends in war and return to a peaceful state. If wars require, these
tools can be used to greater or lesser extents, as the goals of war and threat being leveled are
dynamic things. Should a state need to put more boots on the ground or use more hellfire
missiles, they may. But even with this idea of dynamic proportionality, it can be seen
historically that most wars are fought using just these tools in conjunction with typical military
tactics. That is because most wars are fought for limited reasons and face limited-scale threats.
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Thus, some weapons have been classified as outside the norms of conventional warfare and are
disproportionate to wars of this limited nature according to the rules of proportionality.31
These weapons classified as outside the boundaries of the pursuit of common wartime
goals are given a variety of names: unconventional weapons, weapons of mass destruction,
illegitimate and immoral weapons.32 All of these names point to the idea that they are somehow
different from the 9mm bullet, tomahawk missile, B9 bomber or dreadnaught class warship.
These weapons have a different impact or effect which can be considered outside the bounds of
the normal pursuit of victory and a return to status quo relations, thereby making them immoral.
Historically, this is the justification used for banning assassinations, poisons, bullets that expand
upon entering the body and animal weapons, among others.33 Grotius tells us that
… From the old times the law of nations – if not of all nations certainly of those
of the better sort – has been that it is not permissible to kill an enemy by poison.
Agreement upon this matter arose from a consideration of the common advantage,
in order that the dangers of war, which had begun to be frequent, might not be too
widely extended.34

Similarly, Gentili tells us that both poisoned weapons and the use of poisonous animals fail to be
justifiable in warfare, especially as a response to first use. This is because these weapons, while
cunning in nature, are evil and “evil is not lawful, but an enemy should be dealt with according
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to law. And the law is never evil, but is the practice of the good and the fair.”35 In other words,
wartime experiences with these types of weapons “shock the instincts of humanity.”36 While
some weapons do not start out as being understood as immoral, once wartime experience and
further understanding is achieved, they may be reclassified as unconventional on the grounds that
they (a) cause excessive damage as compared to the goals of the war, (b) are indiscriminant in
their targeting, or (c) cause pain or suffering which is inhumane in nature. Examples of weapons
which have undergone this classification scheme from conventional to unconventional include
but are not limited to: radiological devices (fusion, fission, tactical, and dirty nuclear arms);
biological and pathological weapons; chemical and biochemical weapons, as well as the
aforementioned examples from Gross that are already banned. What makes these weapons
unusable during conventional wars is the disproportionate impact they have on a battlefield and
the reactions they garner after the fact.
Compare for instance the U.S. military’s tomahawk missile versus either of the fission
bombs dropped during World War II. A tomahawk missile is a 1 ton explosive with a range of
1,000 kilometers and a preprogramed destination. Its impact ratio is low yield and casualties
caused are limited if the target is a typical military target.37 Conversely, Little Boy was a 15
kiloton nuclear device capable of being dropped anywhere in the world that a B29 bomber could
fly to. It was not precision guided, meaning that wherever it was dropped would be immediately
devastated including any non-combatant targets. This means that the impact ratio in Nagasaki
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was much greater than the typical tomahawk missile. The result of Little Boy was the levelling
an entire city and casualties amounting to over 75,000 individuals, civilians and soldiers alike.38
The difference between the conventional explosive and the nuclear counterpart is staggering.
Unconventional weapons then have three major defining factors that set them apart.
First, their level of force is well beyond the average armament. States could destroy whole cities
or populaces with limited numbers of these weapons, let alone the level of destruction one could
cause if all of these weapons were used. Second, these weapons lack the capacity for specified
differentiation between civilians and combatants. Biological agents spread via vectors the same
way that diseases do – to those who are closest. Chemical agents are dispersed in gas form,
meaning they can travel wherever the wind blows them and harm whoever is nearby, friend or
foe, civilian or soldier. Nuclear arms, even tactical ones, can destroy cities or villages in the
blink of eye without concern for specified targeting. In all three cases, the indiscriminate nature
of the weapon is important when considering its use in war. Finally, the way that these weapons
kill can be of concern to decision-makers. Images of horrifying deaths, asphyxiating men,
women and children, come to mind when one thinks of chemical arms. The effects of the plague
or cholera, blistering agents, nerve agents that shut down one’s internal nervous system slowly
and painfully are both shocking and angering. The long term effects of radiological fallout, the
generations impacted after these weapons are used. All of these come to mind when we think of
the effects of these weapons. It is for these three reasons that some weapons gain the moniker of
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unconventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. They are abnormal weapons,
disproportionate and not to be used during conventional warfare.

The Swords of Damocles, Weapons of Supreme Emergencies

If that were where the story ends for unconventional weapons, namely that they are
illegitimate, immoral and unusable, then one could argue as Price and Tannenwald do that there
is a taboo or prohibitionary norm in place which restrains states from using said weapons. And
to some extent, that is a convincing argument. In light of experiences during the World Wars,
there has been a marked decrease in the use of CBWs by major powers and no wartime use of
nuclear weapons by any state. This marked decrease is further enhanced by the numerous
opportunities and incentives that states had to break from the “taboos” that Price and
Tannenwald describe. That is strong evidence to assert that the concerns of utility and deterrence
play a lesser role is determining policy toward these weapons, while a prohibitionary norm plays
an important role. However, the absolute prohibition argument only takes into account a limited
range of discussion, serious planning and continuing concern about the role that these weapons
play in wartime decision-making. It does not account for oscillations in the seriousness of policy
drafting, nor the narrow misses or lines in the sand that leaders have drawn where these weapons
are concerned. This is where the idea of proportionality can help to explain the reality of
decision-making. The norm of proportionality permits for consideration and planning of
unconventional weapon against certain targets providing that extreme circumstances have been
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met. Actual use would happen only if the most extreme of threats, imminent loss and
destruction, were a distinct probability. Even then though, there would be active resistance to the
idea of unconventional use, marking it as weapon of last resort, something which would never
happen according to Price or Tannenwald.
Notice that to determine the legitimacy of conventional arms, the weapons have been
related to conventional or non-essential causes for war. Ends such as acquired territorial defense,
reputation, or economic concerns are conventional things which require limited responses. If
one were to lose out on a source of timber or to lose control over a conquered entity, it would not
mean the demise of the losing state. Other sources of income or territories could be gained
which would offset the loss. Even the most vital of interests or salient of concerns still begets
conventional arms use to pursue wartime goals. But there is one threat which may be
unconventional, nigh unthinkable, thereby necessitating a great use of force – the threat to the
very existence and well-being of a state as a whole.
Existential threats are greater than any other type of threat and require a different calculus
of ends and means than the typical war. Where typical wars will result in small losses and only
necessitate conventional arms, existential threats mean that a state faces its complete and utter
demise. As Walzer puts it, these are wars of supreme emergency.39 These threats only take on
one form: a loss results in the physical destruction of the state and its inhabitants by an enemy
who seeks to eradicate it from the earth. This type of warfare is extremely rare. Carl von
Clausewitz puts it best when he describes this type of war as theoretical war, war which goes to
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extremes in order to completely secure oneself.40 These types of threats are special in that they
are (a) directed at or directly threaten the homefront and (b) are immediate with the most costly
result possible in war. Their scope and degree of risk is exponentially greater than the common
threats of loss, thereby necessitating uncommon uses of force to forestall or eliminate the risk of
loss.
Wars, being dynamic social interactions, may not begin as existential threats. Instead, it
is possible that through prolonged fighting, new technological advents or third party
involvement, a war may progressively become an existential threat to safety and security. As
Walzer describes it, “supreme emergency” is the argument
…that there is fear beyond the ordinary fearfulness (and frantic opportunism) of
war, and a danger to which that fear corresponds, and that this fear and danger
may well require exactly those measures that the war convention bars… It is
defined by two criteria… the first has to do with the imminence of danger and the
second with its nature. The two criteria must both be applied. Neither one by
itself is sufficient as an account of extremity nor as a defense of the extraordinary
measures extremity is thought to require.41

At such a time as existential threat comes to be, the restrictions imposed by the war convention
may be loosened, though not lifted altogether. But reaching this point in a war is extremely
uncommon; most wars never progress beyond simple planning in the instance that it should
become an existential war. This means that as losses in terms of life, military capacities, and
financial costs increase, it is possible for states to begin planning for the use of unconventional
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weapons. In most cases, these plans are last resorts or contingencies to be used only when the
most existential crises occur, such as conflict between great powers that directly threatens
homeland security and continued existence. Think of these plans as lines in the sand, conditions
under which it may be legitimate to utilize the most deadly tools in one’s arsenal. Until such a
time as these lines are crossed and the threat becomes existential, these unconventional weapons
are restrained from being used while remaining a constant threat looming in the background. As
Kennedy put it to the U.N. General Assembly in 1961, “Every man, woman and child lives under
a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any
moment by accident or miscalculation or by madness.”42 Thus far, no scenarios have occurred to
result in a cutting of this thread and the unleashing of these swords of Damocles, given that the
associated exigent scenarios or conditions have not come to pass.
It is important to note that this does not necessarily mean that an actor will or should
respond in kind if an unconventional weapon is used by a belligerent or non-state actor. One
actor behaving barbarously, especially where there is no imminent threat to the deciding state,
does not mean that the deciding state is no longer bound by the war convention rules. Such
actions have a potential for extreme and unnecessary escalation, which can result in existential
crises which need not occur in the first place. In fact, it may be the case that belligerent use will
be met with massive conventional force as a means of compelling the belligerent to halt its
unconventional arms use. Several such interventions have been the case in history, especially
after the Cold War.
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But what does this criterion of last resort mean for the rule prohibiting harm to non-combatants?
Unconventional weapons, as has already been discussed, are notoriously uncontrollable. They
harm civilians and soldiers alike, level whole cities or spread like the plague. It is this
uncontrollable factor which truly sets them apart from other conventional arms. However, when
an existential threat exists, it is possible that part of that threat is a clash of cultures or
civilizations whereby one seeks to totally annihilate the other. Alternatively, it is possible that
the soldier class is so embedded within civilian populaces that it becomes highly risky to
eliminate them one by one as opposed to largely explosive strikes which may harm civilians.
These are key parts of what makes existential threats so threatening – their scope is enormous
and has a finite result if a loss is suffered. At that point, the restriction on collateral damage and
harm to non-combatants is loosened and the right to kill is expanded.43 This does not mean that
a state gains the right to slaughter needlessly, nor should their goal be to purposefully harm
civilians in order to persuade their opponents to give up. Instead, the goal should still be to cause
only that harm to combatant populations which is necessary to return to the status quo of peace
and limit the harm done to civilian populaces, in keeping with the doctrine of double effect. But
this does allow for greater civilian casualties than would be normally permissible under the war
convention as it is a greater threat than is typically faced in war.44 Should the threat wane or
disappear, it should be expected that the acting state will scale back their operations to only
conventional arms once more for the duration of the fighting or until another existential threat
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condition is met. This appears to be how states have typically acted, barring some aberrations
from the norm over the course of human history.

Methodology for Testing the Logics of Non-Use

At this point, it is important to determine which of the above logics is most operable and
effective in the decisions revolving around unconventional weapons. Is it the calculus of utility
and maximum expected gains? Is it the logic of deterrence and a fear of absolute retaliation? Is
it a moral imperative demanding absolute obedience and non-use? Or is it the Just War logics of
target distinction, proportional response and last resort? To make this determination, it becomes
necessary to look at real world cases and draw lessons from the motivations and actions of
policy-makers. A series of case studies must be investigated. For this particular study, the
optimal subject is the United States. It has historically had the largest arsenal, been involved in
every major war (both symmetric and asymmetric) since its inception, and has used then stopped
using both nuclear and bio-chemical weapons. Controlling for continued major power status and
constant regime type, this suggest just one state to examine: the United States. Thus, the series
of case studies chosen here will examine decisions the United States made about nuclear and
CBW use during the 20th century in the wars it has fought. These wars are World War I, World
War II, and the Korean War. After these cases, concluding remarks about which logic(s) were
active in decision-making will be made. Additionally, possible future research, critical
questions, and other possible unconventional weapons will be addressed.
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Each of the logics of non-use has its own identifying characteristics to help determine its
impact on decision-making. If utility is at work in decision-making, then greater consideration
of use should occur at the beginning of a conflict or during strategically valuable times within the
conflict. The goal of the outcome should be victory and any means should be on the table and
used when possible. If deterrence is at work, the concern should be with the greater degree of
risk associated with facing other major powers. When the battle is symmetric in terms of power
distribution, risk is high and use should be minimal; conversely, when the battle is asymmetric,
risk is low and use should be greater. If absolute prohibitionary norms or taboos are at work,
then use considerations should be highly limited and concern for the immoral nature of the
weapons should be the dominant concern. No temptation or threat should cause a wavering of
position from a strict doctrine of non-use, especially after World War II. There should be little to
no oscillation in policy toward the various unconventional weapons as long as the social
disapprobation remains consistent, if the absolute taboo explanation is correct. Moreover, the
justifications for a CBW taboo and nuclear taboo should not mirror one another, but have
different origins and reasoning. Findings of these results would show the continued relevance of
traditional international relations theory where unconventional weapon use and non-use is
concerned.
Alternatively, if Just War norms are at work, several things should be visible. First,
concern over the goals versus the available and necessary means should be visible. Discussions
of limited engagements or existential conflicts should be a part of this finding, if any exist.
Second, as the conflict becomes more serious, discussions of legitimate targets and acceptable
casualties of war should be part of the ongoing policy conversations where unconventional
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weapons are concerned. These discussions should gradually increase as the threat increases, or
cease if the threat decreases. Third, the effects of the weapons, or lack of knowledge in first use
cases, should be apparent when determining if such a weapon should be used. More than simply
considering the weapons as “bad” or “taboo” according to the world community, decisionmakers should be concerned with the unintended and intended effects of the weapons against
their chosen targets and given the circumstances of the war itself. Fourth, if it is the case that the
conflict may become existential, conditions for considering legitimate use of unconventional
weapons should gradually become part of the policy debates. If a differentiation between
conventional and unconventional weapons has been made, actual use should not occur until
imminent destruction or loss becomes highly probable. Even then, active resistance, moral
outcries or immediate regret within the acting party about the use should occur. Findings fitting
these criteria would indicate that norms associated with proportionality, discrimination and last
resort exigency are functioning within the policy creation process. Additionally, if the findings
for CBWs and nuclear arms mirror one another and their prohibitions are founded on the same
logics, then it can be said that the rules governing these individual weapon types are the same
which is in opposition to Price and Tannenwald’s assertions of the individuality of these taboos.
Determinations will be the result of archival research into the Foreign Relations of the
U.S., U.N. Security Council and General Assembly meetings, as well as other treaties, laws,
memoirs and major actor writings available. Given the complexity of the discussions relating to
these weapons, actors from a range of political, military and social settings will be key at
determining which factors are most influential to wartime decisions. Concern and consideration
will not be limited to the views of presidents and their immediate subordinates in the cabinet and

39
higher military ranks; implementation and acceptability of these decisions necessitates an
examination of the surrounding dialogue and decisions of soldiers on the battlefield, the domestic
front and a variety of international players. When direct sources to attain the views of these
actors are unavailable, supplemental secondary historical sources will be used. It should be
noted that this has become the common method for investigating the impact of norms on
decision-making. This method should also reveal any concerns within the decision-making
discourse that are associated with any of the alternative logics, not simply Just War norms. The
only major drawbacks to such a method are that the results may not be completely generalizable
to all member states within the international system and that some documentation may not be
available which may alter the outcome of the case studies. Despite these weaknesses to the
methodology, it will provide the leverage into the decision-making and surrounding discourse
that is necessary for evaluating the competing theories against the historical record.

CHAPTER 3
WORLD WAR I: THE CHEMIST’S WAR

Elementis regamus proelium. We rule the battle through the elements.
~ Motto of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps

The theory proposed in the previous chapter has two technical portions: the initial phase
of applying the norms of Just War to new modes of warfare and the continuing impact of that
application on future wars. This chapter, in conjunction with Chapter 4, will seek to test the first
part of the theory – did the initiation of the non-use tradition of biological, chemical and
radiological weapons begin because of considerations about their justifiability and morality? Did
they fall outside the parameters of acceptable means of pursuing victory in limited wars due to
their effects, unpredictability or disproportionate nature? Was there simply an overwhelming
feeling that absolute prohibition was necessary regardless of circumstance? Or was the origin of
non-use something akin to the logics of utility and deterrence, which are primarily concerned
with power distribution and strategic viability? To answer this question of first application, it is
necessary to investigate two cases: the first and second World Wars. Investigating them in
tandem will permit for a direct comparison of the logics of utility, deterrence, absolute
prohibitionary norms, and the norms of Just War. By chapter’s end, it should be possible to
claim to that one or more of these perspectives on the origins of non-use is visible within the
decision-making processes of the United States.
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World War I: The Chemist’s War

World War I represents many things when investigating the developments of military
arms and tactics. The first tanks, dogfights and modern machine guns originate during this
period of extreme innovation. But of the many new technologies of warfare to come out of
World War I, none is more questionable than the development of bio-chemical agents in all their
weaponized forms. From mustard gas to phosgene, chlorine gas to agent VX, the First World
War saw just how gas weapons could impact the battlefield. The Allies and Central Powers used
28 gases and 16 mixtures of gases during World War I.1 All major parties to the war sought to
develop their own chemical weapons in order to gain the upper hand. As such, this was has
largely become known as the Chemist’s War because of how influential this technological
development was.
In all, approximately one million casualties out of the 26 million deaths in World War I
can be traced back to chemical weapons use. The U.S. alone lost 72,000 soldiers to gas warfare.
But before these deaths ever occurred, the world tried to ban the use of asphyxiating agents at the
Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. Most parties to the war signed onto this ban, in fact. If
Price was right, then a norm against specifically chemical agents should have existed and
stopped any future use. Yet, the use of chemical weapons still happened. Why? What elements

Brooks Kleber and Dale Birdsell, United States Army in World War II: The Chemical Warfare Service – Chemicals
in Combat, Vol. 3 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 2003): 5.
1

42
were missing? What did the U.S. and the rest of world truly think about chemical agents and the
rules dictating their non-use?
To understand why use occurred, one must start first with Price’s assertions and the
Hague Conferences. If a taboo was in its infancy here, sans firsthand knowledge of a not yet
invented weapon, then restraint should by the natural path for all parties involved; however, it is
not the case that restraint occurs. Because of this, it is necessary to determine if Realist or Just
War perspectives were at play to dictate use during the war. Looking at the U.S. entry into war
and delay of chemical weapon use, as well as the rhetoric and understandings surrounding these
new technologies, it becomes apparent that there are moral misgivings that are overcome not by
expediency but by necessity in the face of loss. These experiences will go on to shape the
discourse surrounding any future use of these weapons, with the U.S. changing its position from
the Hague Convention and arguing a more moral restraint except in the case of future wartime
exigencies. As such, it should become apparent that Just War norms of proportionality and
supreme emergency, as well as a lack of knowledge about chemical weapons, are at play within
the experiences of World War I.

The Hague Peace Conferences

Before chemical weapons as we know them today ever existed or development programs
had begun, the world tried to stop their use. This point is a pivotal one in the history of Just War
norms application as it is one of the rare instances where the world, in a mostly united voice,
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tried to pre-emptively eliminate an imagined tool of war before ever experiencing it. But
because of the abstractness of the weapon system in the minds of some men and the lack of
experience with world threatening warfare, this application appears to have failed in impacting
decision-making. The historical point in question is the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907,
where the world spoke and no one listened, especially the United States.
The Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 were intended to provide states with a body of
laws governing international interactions in order to limit both the chances and destructive
capacities of war. In an effort to band together all states, these rules were to be codified and
widely distributed to the members of the world community. They would be voted on by
members, who could opt into or out of whatever aspects they wanted. This was especially the
view of the U.S. delegates. These individuals were instructed by Secretary of State Elihu Root in
1907 that:
In the discussions upon every question it is important to remember that the object of the
Conference is agreement, and not compulsion. If such conferences are to be made
occasions for trying to force nations into positions which they consider against their
interests, the Powers cannot be expected to send representatives to them. It is important
also that the agreements reached shall be genuine and not reluctant. Otherwise, they will
inevitably fail to receive approval when submitted for the ratification of the Powers
represented.2

On this basis, the U.S. delegates were to examine and question carefully all aspects of any
discussion and to refuse to assent to any articles which were compulsive in nature. That was the
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case with the First Declaration in the Final Act of the Peace Conference of 1899 – the prohibition
on gas warfare.
The First Declaration reads plainly and succinctly. “The contracting Powers agree to
abstain from the use of projectiles the only object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or
deleterious gas.”3 The intent of this declaration was a clear and permanent prohibition of
weaponized gas systems of a lethal nature, though states may dissent to the rule after 1 year of
following it.4 This was proposed by the Russian delegation along with propositions on the
banning of bombardments from balloons against undefended locales, a prohibition on the
bombing of submarines such that soldiers would not drown to death and a prohibition on the use
of bullets that expanded upon entering the human body. The majority of the representatives
present were agreeable to these rules, including a ban on gas warfare. The problem though was
that no such system existed or had been experienced in 1899 and the U.S. delegate on the
committee, Captain Alfred Mahan, voiced this point in his opposition to this proposition.
Mahan was adamant during the debates that the other states were tying their hands behind
their backs without knowing the consequences of such an imaginary weapon system. As he
stated in his reports back to the U.S.,
… The United States naval delegate [Mahan] did not cast his vote silently, but gave
reasons, which at his demand were inserted in the reports of the day’s proceedings.
These reasons were, briefly: 1. That no shells emitting such gases is as yet in practical
use, or has undergone adequate experiment; consequently, a vote taken now would be
taken in ignorance of the facts as to whether the results would be of a decisive character,
3
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or whether injury in excess of that necessary to attain the end of warfare, the immediate
disabling of the enemy, would be inflicted. 2. That the reproach of cruelty and perfidy,
addressed against these supposed shells, was equally uttered formerly against firearms
and torpedoes, both of which are now employed without scruple. Until we knew the
effects of such asphyxiating shells, there was no saying whether they would be less
merciful than missiles now permitted. 3. That it was illogical, and not demonstrably
humane, to be tender about asphyxiating men with gas, when all were prepared to admit
that it was allowable to blow the bottom out of an ironclad at midnight, throwing four or
five hundred men into the sea, to be choked by water, with scarcely the remotest chance
of escape.5

Mahan’s argument shows a stark difference between the reality of the chemical weapon’s history
and Richard Price’s depiction of the inception of a chemical weapon’s taboo. If Price were right
and this had been a purely moral banning of all gas weapons use, present and future, Mahan’s
argument should not have existed. Instead, Mahan depicts a perspective that inexperience and
imagination are not enough to make a binding rule on men, now or previously. His recalling of
changes in the applicability of norms to firearms and torpedoes is telling – man needs to know
the effects of the tools of war before any rule may stop them using such a weapon. Mahan
summarizes this perspective of a “need to know” nicely when he states, “If, and when, a shell
emitting asphyxiating gases alone has been successfully produced, then, and not before, men will
be able to vote intelligently on the subject.”6 Man cannot ban something which may be
necessary to use in the future, no matter how atrocious that technology and its associated death
may seem.
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But this was not just Mahan’s perspective on the matter; his attitude was reflective of the
entire US executive toward unwarranted compulsions on wartime procedures or systems. Mahan
had been instructed by Secretary of State John Hay to consider that wars will not become less
violent or destructive in the future, therefore delegates should not hinder “inventive genius” in
the “direction of devising means of defense.”7 Even President Wilson did not trust that the
agreements reached in the Hague Conferences would limit warfare as they were intended to.
Between a weak Tribunal system, being too sporadic and overly legal, Wilson thought the impact
of the resulting agreements would be minimal and that instead, a greater bond of nations through
a unifying experience was needed.8
As a result of this perspective of inexperience toward an imaginary weapon, the U.S.
voted against the First Declaration prohibiting gas warfare. So did its ally, Great Britain.
Likewise, the two states also voted against the Second Declaration prohibiting the use of bullets
that expand or flatten in the human body. The other 24 parties to the Conference accepted these
provisions openly and willingly with minimal debate.9 However, of these accepting states, all of
them would eventually break from their agreement after the events of 1915.

7

Charles Carlisle Taylor, The Life of Admiral Mahan: Naval Philosopher (New York: George H. Doran Company,
1920): 96-97.
8

Stockton Axson and Arthur S, Link, Brother Woodrow: A Memoir of Woodrow Wilson (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1993): 4.
9

Scott, Proceedings of the Hague Peace Conferences, pg. 268.

47
Experiencing Asphyxiating Agents Firsthand

The afternoon of April 1915 saw the first use of chemical weapons on the battlefield
despite the results of the Hague Conferences. Three flares was the signal over Ypres, Belgium
that let German soldiers know what was about to happen to their Allied opponents. Following
this, plumes of green-gray smoke began roll forth from the German trenches toward those of the
French and British. Chlorine gas was the weapon of choice. This day was recorded in a letter
from one of the German soldiers, Willi Siebert. There he describes the action.
As this great cloud of green grey gas was forming in front of us, we suddenly heard the
French yelling. In less than a minute they started with the most rifle and machine gun
fire that I had ever heard. Every field artillery gun, every machine gun, every rifle that
the French had, must have been firing… but it was not stopping the gas… In about 15
minutes the gun fire started to quit. After a half hour, only occasional shots. Then
everything was quiet again.10

What Siebert recounts next is the aftermath of the first attack.
What we saw was total death. Nothing was alive. All the animals had come out of their
holes to die… When we go to the French lines the trenches were empty but in a half mile
the bodies of French soldiers were everywhere. It was unbelievable. Then we saw there
were some English. You could see where men had clawed at their faces, and throats,
trying to get breath. Some had shot themselves. The horses, still in their stables, cows,
chickens, everything, all were dead. Everything, even the insects were dead.11
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A.T. Hunter, a Canadian soldier also at the battle of Ypres, describes the mood in the trenches as
passive curiosity at the cloud which quickly turned to active torment. “A burning sensation in
the head, red-hot needles in the lungs, the throat seized as by a stranger.”12 The powerful
imagery evoked in Siebert’s recounting of the attack on Ypres was the world’s first experience
with chemical agents on a battlefield. Utter devastation is all that remained. This was something
the world, and especially the United States, was not prepared for but had to deal with
nonetheless. Even the Germans had doubted that the use of gas weapons would be successful
but were pleasantly surprised at the high degree of casualties accrued.13
The stalemate that had long been held as a result of the Hague Conferences was now
officially broken. The French and British responded in kind to this German aggression and
blatant disregard of whatever norms may have been in place previously. British gas companies
were established and their first use came in Loos, Belgium on September 24, 1915. There they
spread 5,500 cylinders of chlorine gas along a 25-mile road. These toxic candles, as they
became known, blew chlorine smoke along the German lines and were largely successful until
shifts in the wind caused a change of targets. The British troops were more drastically impacted
than their original German targets and the operation was largely a failure. But this did not
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dissuade any party from using chemical arms against those who used them first. It was only
necessary and just to retaliate with a similar kind of attack.14
Like the British, the French responded in kind against the Germans in Ypres in February
1916. Using low-explosive phosgene artillery shells, the French were able to avoid the
catastrophic result of the cylinder attacks performed by the British. They bombarded the
Germans with shells that ruptured on impact and created low dispersion clouds of phosgene
inside the trenches.15 But this would not be the end of weapons development. In July of 1917,
the Germans created the infamous mustard gas and employed it for the first time at Ypres. The
operation was largely successful and the Germans saw this as their ultimate chemical weapon
throughout the war. Nearly one million shells containing 2,500 tons of mustard gas would be
used by the German side.16 But through all of this, the United States remained apart from the
conflict, remaining in isolation while permitting the European sides to gas to one another
endlessly.
However, this does not mean that the U.S. was not taking note of the events and rapidly
developing technologies being employed. General Amos Fries noted that the development of
mustard gas was “probably the greatest single development of gas warfare.”17 But there was fear
that the resulting images of the dead and dying would cause U.S. civilians to second-guess entry
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into World War I. As such, there was a media blackout put into place for the U.S. where
knowledge of the use of chemical weapons was highly filtered where the public was concerned.
Assistant Secretary of War Benedict Crowell noted that if the American public were privy to this
knowledge, there would be “unreasonable dread of gases on the part of the American nation and
its soldiers.”18 But this lack of information and experience resulted in the invocation of myth
and superstition by all American parties. For instance, rumors circulated that Germany had “a
gas that would make soldiers’ eyes drop out of their sockets or their fingers and toes drop off.”19
Gas warfare was intangible to the U.S. and their neutrality during the early phases of World War
I set them very much behind the learning curve. Regardless, on April 2, 1917, Wilson finally
sought a declaration of war against Germany. Notable here though is that the German’s breach
of the Hague Accords regarding chemical weapons was not the cause according to Wilson.
Instead, he premised the entry into World War I as it being a war of Germany against all nations,
and stated
…Armed neutrality, it now appears, is impracticable. Because submarines are in effect
outlaws when used as the German submarines have been used against merchant shipping,
it is impossible to defend ships against their attacks as the law of nations has assumed
that merchantmen would defend themselves upon the open sea.20

Of paramount concern for Wilson was not chemical arms; instead it appears to have been
breaches of other parts of the Hague Accords concerning the laws of naval warfare and the use of
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submarine warfare. This then calls into question even the U.S. perception of any existing norms
of non-use concerning chemical agents. Furthermore, it was obvious to Wilson that German
victory would be a wholly unacceptable result. America could not stand to lose its European
allies, who were barely standing their own ground against the German threat. The hour of
necessity was upon the U.S. to make use of whatever tools were necessary to ensure that loss
would not occur.

The Chemical Weapons Corps

Prior to a declaration of war, the U.S. had not begun development or testing of any
chemical arms. Though they had been keeping a close eye on the accounts of mustard and
phosgene gas attacks by the Germans, U.S. armed forces were far behind their opponents and
allies where chemical arms were concerned. They had in their possessions no weapons,
antidotes, gas masks or detection devices. However, immediately upon declaring war,
preparations for chemical warfare began and were headed by the National Research Council’s
subcommittee on Noxious Gases.21 The subcommittee was to collect information and assess the
threat of all chemical arms being used by belligerent forces, as well as develop antidotes and
defense mechanisms to each type of gas. This research development of the Noxious Gases
subcommittee would then be put into practice by the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF)
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being headed up by General John J. Pershing. Pershing saw the threat of gas warfare as a serious
one which required immediate action on the part of U.S. armed forces.
As a result of this sharp shift in U.S. policy toward gas warfare, the AEF board
determined that there should be a specific officer and unit in charge of all gas weapons and
defenses for the U.S. armed forces. This individual and his unit would be given full reign over
all aspects of U.S. gas warfare programs for the duration of the war.22 This duty would fall in
August of 1917 to the altogether unprepared Lt. Colonel Amos Fries and his Gas Service unit.
Fries was a member of the Army Corps of Engineers with no history in weapons or defenses
development, especially not gas weapons. When put in charge of the Gas Services unit, Fries
protested on this exact account – that he knew nothing about gas warfare or weapons. Pershing
responded by telling him to learn on the job.23 Fries ran into immediate problems of needing
effective gas masks, men, funding and training in order to perform any sort of offensive
missions. But above all else, he had to convince the other American commanders that gas
warfare would be a useful tool and not something that would backfire when used. The War
Department Annual Report of 1917 depicts this problem since gas warfare, while a “scientific
novelty,” was largely overshadowed by the reliance on airplanes and submarines.24 As he saw it,
it was imperative that Gas Service officers “go out and sell gas to the Army.”25
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The primary focus of the Gas Services and the 1st Division was to provide defensive
measures for the Allied forces on the frontlines and not to utilize chemical weapons offensively.
Developing effective gas masks was the first priority of the unit as a result of the British and
French forces’ experiences. Next was training the soldiers and officers in how to avoid the
effects of the various gases. It was important for all involved to know how long each gas would
linger once used, so as to avoid unnecessary casualties. Knowing that phosgene gas lasted 10
minutes, disphosgene lasted 15 minutes and mustard gas last upwards of two days saved many
lives. But this knowledge did not help when commanders saw the objective of the mission as
more important than waiting for the gas to clear. So the next order of business was to develop
“mobile degassing units” on each line of battle which were to help affected soldiers treat gasrelated injuries, as well as to decontaminate the areas impacted by gas attacks.26
After a year of focusing solely on developing defensive implements for gas warfare, the
Gas Services began to focus on the possibility of offensive missions. In summer of 1918, the
Edgewood Arsenal was officially established as the first fully functional chemical weapons
development facility. Here, the Gas Services were able to produce mass amounts of phosgene,
chloropicrin, mustard, chlorine, and sulfur trichloride gas to put into projectile shells for
offensive use. At this same time, Wilson renamed the Gas Services and the 1st Gas and Flame
Regiment. Henceforth, they would be called the Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) and would be
their own separate branch of the U.S. Army. Divisions for offensive and defensive missions, as
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well as research and development, would all be housed in the CWS and headed by now Colonel
Fries. All gas decisions would come from Colonel Fries and General Pershing.27
After nearly a year of entry into the war, the U.S. began to see the necessity of offensive
gas operations. These operations slowly increased in number but a doctrine for offensive combat
was not initially developed by the U.S. forces. Instead, the CWS relied on a translated and
rudimentary French pamphlet explaining that gas warfare had two uses – destructive or first use
fire and neutralizing bombardments or return fire. Of these two tactics, U.S. forces focused on
the latter as it was determined to be more effective and safer.28
The first reported instance of U.S. gas use came in February 1918 as the AEF came under
attack from the Germans. Faced with phosgene and diphosgene projectiles, identifiable by their
“swish and wobbly sound in passage,” Major General Bullard of the 1st Division ordered that the
Gas Services return fire in kind. It became a necessity to defend the position through a weapon
that the U.S. was previously unwilling to use in a first use situation. 1st Regiment Gas Services
returned fire using projectiles filled with cyanogen chloride and phosgene gas shells. The
Germans escalated the chemical exchange days later when they employed mustard gas explosive
shells, thereby marking the first time that the U.S. faced the most dangerous of the gas weapons.
But the most devastating of these exchanges came in March 1918 as the U.S. 42nd Medical
Division was treating victims of another combat gas encounter. They came under fire from the
Germans who were using mustard gas shells. In the space of a few minutes, 270 casualties
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amounted and the first aid station which was to treat gas victims had been drenched in mustard
gas.29
Offensive tactics became somewhat better as artillerymen gained more experience in the
bombardment strategies to be used. But this does not mean the weapon had become an effective
or accepted tool for the Allied forces. The U.S.’s first major gas offensive at St. Mihiel late in
1918 shows this. Commanders, still mistrusting of the weapon, restrained the use of gas while
the opposing German carried out an offensive involving hundreds of thousands of gas shells.
Fighting here revolved around an area of St. Mihiel that the Army called Gas Alley. The
German military had utilized mustard shells to dictate travel, including escape, along a 7
kilometer range. To cover an escape, the Gas Regiment was initially tasked with use of smoke,
flash grenades and non-poisonous chemical arms.30 It was not until just hours before the
operation began that there was a change of orders to include the sparing use of cyanogen and
phosgene in order to cover the movement through the valley. This change was the result of
increased bombardments by German troops, resulting in a greater need for cover fire than could
be provided by smoke and conventional gunfire.31 But it was later noted that the initial
reluctance to use proper chemical weapons was caused by the average soldier’s lack of
understanding of the weapon resulting in moral misgivings about their effects, as the First Army
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general in charge of the operation noted.32 As a result of this restraint, roughly 500 men were
killed by enemy gas attacks, which accounted for one-third of all deaths in the St. Mihiel
operation.33
More effective uses of gas occurred during the Meuse-Argonne campaign in October
1918, where Company F used 230 Livens projectors to create a dense fog of phosgene gas in
conjunction with a bombardment of high explosive shells.34 Despite the increased experience,
many unit commanders complained of the gas officers’ handling of safety and operations. One
division commander noted that the new gas officers were “almost hysterical” while attempting to
train the unit. “Knowledge and real efficient training… came after hard experience” and the gas
officer in question “spoke without knowledge or consideration… [in a tone that comes from]
abstract study.”35 This made both offensive and defensive objectives difficult to obtain, at least
with the rudimentary understandings of the weapons in question and their utility in live-fire
combat scenarios. The assessment that there was a mistrust of these weapons by the common
soldier was further reinforced by those in charge of the 1st Gas Regiment when they describe the
need for average soldiers to acclimate to chemical arms use. “The object sought is
familiarization of the Infantry with the activity of the special troops so that they will not hesitate,
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as they heretofore have on several occasions.”36 But this acclimation and acceptance would not
come about before the war would come to a close, resulting in a continuing fear of what these
soldiers had experienced and what this type of weapon could do.
Finally, gas warfare would end as a result of the Armistice of November 11, 1918. In
total, roughly one million wartime deaths would be the result of gas warfare, out of the estimated
26 million total deaths that were incurred throughout World War I. For the U.S. forces, 72,000
deaths were caused by gas warfare. The belligerent forces against the U.S. faced even greater
losses.37 The cost and learning curve were steep for all parties involved. As such, the world
needed to revisit the legitimacy of these weapons now that we had experienced them as Mahan
had suggested was necessary during the Hague Peace Conferences.

Inter-war Treaties and the 1925 Geneva Convention

As a result of the experiences of World War I, the world felt that a reassessment of
viability of bio-chemical weapons was necessary. The process began with the 1919 Treaty of
Versailles and culminated in the 1925 Geneva Protocol. But that process was not an immediate
formulation of a taboo against CBWs. Instead, the change was progressive and not without
reservation by all parties. Public opinion and the opinions of world leaders, as well as the
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military and corporations, clashed heavily over whether to eliminate these weapons altogether or
to hold onto them in case they should become necessary in the future. That said, the general
attitude and trend over this time was that the rules of warfare needed to be expanded to include
rules governing the use of biological and chemical arms.
This progressive application of norms to chemical and biological arms in a more finite
manner began with the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the subsequent treaties of the Paris
Suburbs. The negotiating parties from the Allied forces formed what was called the Council of
Ten to deal with the experiences of World War I and to create new rules for warfare moving
forward. The Council was composed of ten heads of state and foreign ministers from the United
States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Japan. The representatives thought that CBWs
especially warranted thought and so drafted an article for the Versailles Treaty that specifically
dealt with German aggression using these arms.38 The draft of Article 171 read
The use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or
devices being prohibited, their manufacture and important are strictly forbidden in
Germany. The same applies to materials specifically intended for the manufacture,
storage and use of said products or devices.39

However, the Council had difficulty in getting all members of the committee to agree to the
provision. Two problems arose in the wording: the term “specifically intended” in the second
clause and a translation error between the British and French versions of the provision. The
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former problem resulted in debate about which chemicals might be included as those
“specifically intended” for development of weapons as opposed to the development of domestic
chemical products. The latter problem was much more troublesome. The English version of the
provision implied a ban on all gas weapons while the French prohibited only specific gas
weapons, excluding those that were non-lethal or riot oriented. The interpretation and translation
issue was not settled, but similar provisions as the one for Germany were drafted for Hungary
and Austria as well in Articles 119 and 135 respectively.40 Regardless of language technicalities,
what became obvious was that world opinion thought that chemical and biological weapons
should not be viable, especially where belligerent states were concerned. The chances for use of
these weapons needed to be restricted because they caused unnecessary suffering and they acted
against the principle of humanity in the laws of war. Despite this development and U.S. Council
representatives signing the Treaty of Versailles, the treaty was never ratified by the U.S. Senate.
And thus, the ban on CBWs failed to take effect in spite of the general agreement with it being
necessary.41
That said, the failure to ratify the 1919 CBW ban would not be the only attempt at
prohibiting the use of these unconventional weapons during the interwar period. In 1922 at the
Washington Disarmament Conference, a second attempt would be made to deal with the
technological advances experienced during World War I. The Conference was originally
intended to deal with the increasingly threatening naval competition occurring between the U.S.,
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United Kingdom and Japan, as well as France’s build-up of traditional land forces at an alarming
rate. The Conference was the result of the Senate urging President Hardin to hold meetings to
discuss disarmament and limitations so as to decrease world threat perceptions.42 However,
naval and land forces would not be the only topics of conversation. Secretary of State Hughes
pushed Hardin to broaden the topics under discussion and to begin the conference by discussing
the limitations on CBWs. As Hughes put it to the invited parties, “it may also be found advisable
to formulate proposals by which in the interest of humanity the use of new agencies of warfare
may be suitably controlled.”43 Japan in particular took up this motion and proposed that a full
ban on all poisons and poison gases, including their use and manufacture. The Italian parties to
the conference agreed with the Japanese that a full ban would be most effective, while those
representatives from the U.K., U.S., and France opposed such a strongly worded proposition.
The latter parties argued that the gases in question were being used in manufacturing and local
industries during peacetime, making the restrictions on their acquisition difficult.44
Finally, a decision was made that “the only limitation practicable is to wholly prohibit the
use of gases against cities and other bodies of non-combatants in the same manner as high
explosives may be limited, but that there could be no limitation on their use against the armed
forces of the enemy, ashore or afloat.”45 However, the American delegation was unhappy with
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this result and proposed a counter resolution which was accepted by the conference in January
1922. Their proposed resolution stated
The use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or analogous liquids or other gases and all
materials or devices having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized
world, and a prohibition of such use having been declared in treaties to which a majority
of the civilized powers are parties;
Now, to the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as a part of
international law, binding alike on the conscience and practice of nations, the signatory
powers declare their assent to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby between
themselves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.46

This then became Article V of the Washington Treaty. But even this was deemed a non-binding
resolution on account of difficulties given alliance structures. The British and Italian
representatives argued that if one of the five signatory powers found themselves allied with a
non-signatory or non-adherent power, then the article concerning prohibitions on use may be
nullified due to the exigent circumstances.47 In essence, it was agreed that this would only be
binding on ratifying parties, as per Article VI of the Washington Treaty. Britain, Italy, Japan and
America all ratified the treaty that year, while France refused. Thus, while a general agreement
was obtained, the rule never become binding on the parties.48
Yet another attempt at prohibiting CBWs came in 1923 at the Fifth International
Conference of American States. The conference was intended to air grievances between the
states in the Western hemisphere with the United States acting as the primary intervener in the
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Latin, Caribbean and South American conflicts of the era. Here, the U.S. pushed its neighbors to
sign onto a resolution stating
c) To recommend that the Governments reiterate the prohibition of the use of
asphyxiating or poisonous gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, such as
are indicated in the Treaty of Washington, dated February 6, 1932.49

It is clear that by this point, the U.S. executive had centered on a need to limit the terms of use
for CBWs by its neighbors and allies. The goal of the U.S. resolution was to reinforce the legal
application of the norm against unconventional or inhumane weapons, of which CBWs were the
pinnacle at the time. Unfortunately, despite the clear U.S. position, the other parties at the
conference refused to sign. Columbia especially was unwilling to limit its choice of weapons in
the event that a border war might break out with Brazil. As such, for the third time, the legal
application to CBWs failed to take but one final push would come in 1925 at Geneva.50
The League of Nations had been studying these weapons beginning in 1920. They put
into place two committees to investigate the effects of CBWs and educate states based on the
new information. These two committees, the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military,
Naval and Air Questions and the Temporary Mixed Commission on Arms Reductions, came
back with similar conclusions. The Permanent Advisory Committee reported that gas warfare
was a cruel means of pursuing victory, but its use could not easily be limited due to peacetime
expansions on the use of such gases in industry. It pushed for states to enforce penalties upon
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their peers who deviated from a prohibition of such weapons based on the them breaking the
laws of humanity.51 But it also asked for scientists to become more involved in the process of
education, something that the Temporary Mixed Commission would take up. The Temporary
Mixed Commission selected scientific experts “to study the development of chemical warfare
and to prepare a report upon its probably effects in any future war.”52 These experts were tasked
with studying both chemical and bacteriological arms, given their similar status in international
law. The result was their study was that chemical and bacteriological weapons at their current
stage were harmful, even deadly, to civilians, combatants, and animal life but not to plants or
wealth. That said, the experts did caution that technological developments of defoliants, crop
destruction chemicals, and bacteriological sciences could make these weapons boundless and a
problem for “all mankind.”53 This information would be the direct impetus for the Geneva
Protocol of 1925.
The League of Nations called together a conference at Geneva for the Supervision of the
International Trade in Arms and Ammunition and in Implements of War. While the original
agenda did not include a discussion of CBWs, the U.S. delegates had been strongly instructed to
seek a ban on their use, trade and manufacturing. President Coolidge and Secretary of State
Frank Kellogg saw this as an opportunity to develop a degree of arms control, especially where
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CBWs was concerned.54 This came to the forefront during the Second Plenary Meeting where
the U.S. commission proposed a draft resolution to “deal with the traffic in poisonous gases with
the hope of reducing the barbarity of modern warfare.”55 The proposal, which was not a
universal ban on all aspects of CBWs but instead a narrowly defined scope therein, read
The High Contracting Parties agree to prohibit the export from their territory of all
asphyxiating, toxic or deleterious gases, and all analogous liquids, exclusively designed
or intended for use in connection with operations of war.56

The Polish delegation amended this to also apply to bacteriological warfare. This addition was
welcomed by the U.S. delegation, which stated that “bacteriological warfare is so revolting and
so foul that it must meet with the condemnation of all civilized nations.”57 The goal became to
see all participants pledge that they would abstain from CBW use in future wars, as that was
agreed to be the extent of prohibition that could be obtained given the national chemical
industries of certain states.
As a result, the final version of the amendment became the “Protocol for the Prohibition
of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
Warfare.” Its text reads in part as follows:
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Whereas the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous
liquids, materials or devices has been justly condemned by the general opinion of the
civilized world; and
Whereas the prohibition of such use has been declared in treaties to which the majority of
Powers of the world are Parties; and
To the end that this prohibition shall be universally accepted as part of International Law,
binding alike the conscience and practice of nations;
Declare:
That the High Contracting Parties, so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties
prohibiting such use, accept this prohibition, agree to extend this prohibition to the use of
bacteriological methods of warfare and agree to be bound as between themselves
according to the terms of this declaration.58

This wording paints the picture of a moral and experienced argument against CBWs. The
applied rule is binding on the “conscience” of the “civilized world,” and is favored by the
majority of the parties present at the conference. And based on the arguments being supplied by
the parties involved in its drafting, it appears that what they are really doing is applying preexisting “laws of humanity” in order to prohibit use of CBWs as some illegitimate form of
weaponry.
Now, if this were a taboo norm as Price describes it, then the fact that the Geneva 1925
formulation of a norm against CBWs was created should result in all states ratifying the
convention and non-use becoming the rule of thumb. However, that is not the case. Despite the
strong language and near universal agreement that a rule limiting the terms of use for CBWs was
necessary, two states would abstain from ratifying the 1925 Protocol. One of those states was
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Japan. Ironically, the other non-ratifying state was the same one which originally proposed the
prohibition – the United States. Domestically, the U.S. saw great backing from the executive
branch and a general public favor for ratification. Even General Pershing, who was to oversee
the Chemical Weapons Corps during World War I, had become opposed to further chemical
weapons use by the U.S. and other states. He is quoted as saying, “Chemical weapons should be
abolished among nations as abhorrent to civilization. It is a cruel, unfair, and improper use of
science. It is fraught with the gravest danger to noncombatants and demoralizing to the better
instincts of humanity.”59 That said, a strong propaganda campaign from the chemical industry
and an unfavorable group of Senators known as the Irreconcilables resulted in a failure to ratify
the convention. The most compelling argument from the Irreconcilables came from Senator
David Reed, who notes that a blanket ban of all CBWs may hinder the ability to achieve victory.
He stated,
The whole purpose of a weapon is not to kill your adversary; it is to make him ineffective
from a military standpoint so that the battle may be won… If in our next war we can
anesthetize or temporarily blind our adversary, he may as good as new the next day, but
we have accomplished the same military advantage as if we put him underground with a
little wooden cross over him… Are we, then, to go against an inferior antagonist, with all
the abundance of artillery that the World War has left us, to blow out of existence a lot of
peasants who scarcely know what the war is about? Or are we to take advantage of this
great chemical opportunity which we, as a manufacturing nation, have open to us?
Would it not be more merciful, assuming that we were at war with some Central
American country, to win our battles by the temporary disabling of our enemies than to
blow them all over their cactus plants?60
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Conclusions

The question arises then: which logic was at play before, during and after World War I
while chemical and biological agents were being developed? Was it the logic of utility,
deterrence, absolute prohibition or Just War concerns?
If one considers solely the period leading up to first use, there appear to be some degree
of utility and deterrence concerns at work in the minds of decision makers. Their natural
resistance to relieving themselves of a tool of war, one which could stem the tide of battle and
result in victory, is obvious. U.S. decision makers especially show this perspective. Their
argument that one should not relinquish their weapons or tactics without experience is keenly
equitable to the position of the logic of utility. But this position is not held throughout the war,
by decision makers or soldiers and is rebuked after experience is gained, most especially by the
U.S. in their spearheaded attempts to prohibit use of the weapons in future wars. As such, utility
or deterrence concerns cannot be the sole logic for use and non-use, at least not during World
War I.
It is this same line of argumentation, the transition from U.S. arguments in favor of
CBWs to arguments opposing their spread and future use, which Price is so aware of and which
premise his prohibitionary norm logic. That immediate switch is key for Price. But he has
problems explaining the expansive use of CBWs except to say that the ex nihilo taboo was latent
during World War I. If that is the case, the norm could hardly be claimed as a taboo or an
absolute prohibition. Moreover, the failure of the U.S. and Japan to ratify the Geneva
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Convention after the fact also points toward this not being an absolute prohibitionary norm. Was
this an absolute norm, experience should have sharpened the moral indignation of the world
community and resulted in a unanimous decision to relieve states of the burden of debate where
these weapons were concerned. However, that was not the case. Even those states that ratified
the Geneva Convention formulation of the norm added special addendums, reservations or
limitations of applicability. France, the Soviet Union, Belgium, Romania, South Africa,
Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, Canada and India all ratified the treaty while adding
reservations of varying degrees whereby they would not be bound by the convention given
certain conditions.61 For several states, such as France and Britain, two reservations were made:
(1) that the protocol would be binding only when dealing with others who had ratified it as well
and (2) if any enemy state should break from the protocol, then use of CBWs in response may
become legitimized. The Soviet Union went even further, agreeing with the first reservation of
France and Britain, but adding that should an enemy ratifying state ally with a non-ratifying
state, then the protocol would become ineffectual and Russia would be free to resort to open
CBW use even without provocation.62 Now, it should be noted that all of these reservations have
since been withdrawn, but many stayed in place through the fall of the Soviet Union, meaning
that a taboo was not in place so much as set of parameters under which CBW use may again
become legitimate.
These concerning findings call into question the taboo norm description of events, as well
as accounts from the logics of utility and deterrence. Elements of these explanations appear at
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varying points but none can explain the oscillations in decision making. Instead, if one looks at
the Just War logics of proportionality and noncombatant harm, a stronger case can be made that
these are the concerns of decision makers and soldiers alike. Recall that for a state to classify a
weapon as unconventional and illegitimate, it needs to have experience with that weapon,
understand its effects, and measure the desired ends of the conflict versus the means available to
determine which actions are necessary. The initial resistance by the U.S. to the ex nihilo
prohibition in 1899 could be explained as being due to a lack of battlefield experience, or any
advanced understanding of the tools being prohibited. This is reflected in Mahan’s arguments as
to why the prohibition should not take effect.
Moreover, CBW use is not initiated until late in the war, as a result of both combatants
and noncombatants being targeted by German gas attacks. Until that point, the U.S. was willing
to fight the war using conventional arms and CBW defensive technologies. Even after the green
light was given for CBW use, U.S. soldiers were weary of using them. They were seen as
unnatural, inhumane, and overly cruel weapons which caused horrendous deaths to those who
were targeted or simply caught in the crossfire. This points to the probability that these tools
were a class apart from the usual bullets and bombs; they were something to be feared and used
only in the most extreme circumstances. Additionally, the international legal developments that
followed from these experiences can be explained using this idea of proportionality and extreme
threat. While states largely agreed that these weapons were not to be used again, the logic of last
resort would dictate that reservations or addendums be added which stipulate special
circumstances under which prudential actors may be faced with extreme threats and require the
use of such weapons once more. This is why each major power added such an addendum to their
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signing or ratification of the Geneva Convention, just in case some unforeseen exigent scenario
should arise.
Based on this analysis of the developmental timeline for CBW non-use, it appears that
states are acting both prudentially and in accord with Just War norms to create limitations and
conditions for the use of CBWs in light of their experiences during World War I. The question
would be this: if another major world conflict would occur, would the conditions for use be met?
Would use of CBWs occur? Or would the norm hold? And would any other new technology be
created to fill the void of massively effective weaponry left by the prohibition on CBWs? That
answer would come just two decades later during World War II.

CHAPTER 4
WORLD WAR II: THE ATOMIC WAR

I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds.
~ Robert Oppenheimer, Reaction to the Trinity Test, 16 July 1945

Facing yet another globally destabilizing threat, the world entered into a second deadly
and costly war. Axis and Allied powers fought on four fronts: the European Front, Soviet Front,
North African Front and Pacific Front. Every major power was involved once more, with greater
technological advancement and greater threat to the populaces of every country. Where World
War I saw soldiers become ninety-five percent of all battle deaths, World War II would see only
a third of all battle deaths be soldiers; the other two-thirds were civilians. This translates to an
estimated fifteen million soldier deaths versus forty-five million civilian deaths, though countries
such as China may have suffered an even greater civilian death toll.1 The degree of devastation
was significantly greater for all parties involved.
Unconventional weapons were chief among the many advancements that increased the
destructiveness of this war. Chemical weapons saw the light of day once more, despite the tacit
agreements and international treaties signed during the interwar period. Germany and Japan

The National World War II Museum, “By the Numbers: World-Wide Deaths,” available at
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/world-widedeaths.html?referrer=https://www.google.com/, Updated 20 May 2017. [Accessed 24 May 2017].
1

72
were especially guilty of such weapons use, but not the U.S. Here, the U.S. drew a line in the
sand and resisted use once more, though not without serious temptations during the invasion of
Normandy and Japan. Arguments in favor of strategic utility and punitive vengeance against
Axis powers were pressed upon Roosevelt and Truman, both in domestic and international
settings. But moral concerns about the appropriateness of CBWs given the circumstances of the
war stayed the hand of the U.S.
However, if World War I was the war of the chemists for the U.S., World War II was the
war of the physicists. Instead of using CBWs, the U.S. developed a new technology, one more
deadly than any bomb in any other state’s arsenal: the atom bomb. Its use was awe-inspiring; its
legitimacy was debatable. The world’s reaction was pure stunned silence, followed by serious
questions about how such an explosive device could ever be considered conventional. And then,
the U.S. sought to limit its spread and use in the aftermath of their first experiences with the
bomb. The question of why this immediate change occurred must be asked. The U.S. had used a
weapon of immense power against an enemy combatant twice in short order believing that the
weapon it had developed was nothing more than a large explosive device; realization did not set
in until after seeing it in action that the level of destruction, the spread of radioactivity and
casualties to non-combatants caused was beyond acceptability. Use appears to have been the
result of both supreme emergency in the face of a highly resistant and entrenched enemy force
which pushed the U.S. to use a weapon it did not fully understand and immediately regretted. As
such, the U.S. took it upon itself to both domestically and internationally stem the spread and use
of such a weapon again. This change in stance, from weapon ignorance and necessity to regret
and restraint mirrors what has already been set out the World War I case as the policy shift
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toward chemical weapons by the U.S. Thus, it will become apparent that both tools of war
follow a similar arc when comparing their first use and immediate restraint policies.

The “No First Use” Doctrine of Chemical Arms

The beginning of World War II is largely inconspicuous. It starts with the take-over of
China by Japan in 1937, followed the German occupation of Austria, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and finally Poland between 1937 and 1939. It takes two years before Britain and
France invoke the Anglo-Polish military alliance in order to halt the westward progression of the
German Wehrmacht. What followed was an exponentially increasing number of casualties, cities
devastated by air bombardments (most prominently featured among these were London and
Berlin), and most notoriously the start of the Holocaust. But notably, the U.S. remained absent
from the fray as they had at the start of World War I. President Roosevelt sought to maintain the
status quo of peace, to resist escalation where possible. His letter to Adolf Hitler shows just that
intention when he requests Hitler announce to the world that his goals are not that of aggression
but of peace.2 Roosevelt’s appeal to peace fell on deaf ears though, with Hitler believing that the
U.S. position was a trick, thereby necessitating expedition of the plans for the growing German
Empire.3 Given this failure, Roosevelt reached out to his counterparts in the British and French
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governments to seek assurances that the war would be limited in nature, which was met with
greater acceptability. As passed through the British Ambassador, Britain and France’s positions
would be to “conduct hostilities with a firm desire to spare the civilian population” and to
“exclude objectives which have no strictly defined military importance.”4 Based on these
assurances, Roosevelt and the U.S. declared neutrality in this new European War, noting of
course that breaches of the peace enjoyed by the various belligerents (especially by sea vessels)
would be tantamount to a declaration of war and treated as such.5 It would not be until
December 8, 1941 that the U.S. would declare war. The declaration followed the direct and
surprise attack by the Japanese on Pearl Harbor. It was then that serious consideration and
arguments for restraint of CBWs would occur for all major parties in the war.
During the lead up to and in the early stages of World War II, Germany had come to
perfect a new and deadly tool in its CBW arsenal on top of the stockpiles of mustard and V
compounds already in their possession. This weapon was known as tabun, or taboo, and was a
potent nerve agent. Having been accidentally developed as a failed herbicide in 1936, the
German military had found other uses for it. It was refined and renamed sarin by the Spandau
Citadel scientists working for the German military. 6 These compounds were weaponized and
used as a mist which would block nerve receptors from receiving brain signals, thereby
overstimulating the body’s organs, resulting in vomiting, seizures and asphyxiation. Further
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refinement netted the compound soman, another nerve agent that was twice as effective as sarin.7
U.S. estimates in the Army Manual TM 3-215 state that soman, if inhaled, would be deadly in a
matter of three minutes.8 The successful tests of these agents by the German military had some
seeking to use them in open combat as they had been used in World War I. Colonel Hermann
Oschsner argued that “There is no doubt that a city like London would be plunged into a state of
unbearable turmoil that would bring enormous pressure to bear on the enemy government.”9
Hitler resisted this urge to use CBWs in open combat despite its arguable utility. In a
letter to responding to the British, French and Americans seeking reassurances that chemical
arms would not be used, the German government stated that it would observe the war
prohibitions which form the subject of the Geneva protocol, while reserving the right to break
said protocols if anyone else violated the agreement.10 When the Soviets claimed to have found
a German military manual in 1941 which provided offensive CBW plans, the Germans
responded that such a plan was in keeping with the protocols but was not a plan of first use.
Additionally, they stated that “if the Soviets use the discovery of German instructions about gas
as an excuse to begin gas warfare, Germany will answer appropriately.”11 For the Germans on
the battlefield, gas had been relegated to a retaliatory tool instead of a first choice weapon.
Instead, the German Wehrmacht opted to use chemical compounds such as mustard gas and
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Zyklon B in concentration camps against non-combatants. Six gassing installations were built at
the camps in Brandenburg, Grafeneck, Hadamar, Bernburg, Hartheim, and Sonnestein.
Additionally, German soldiers developed einsatzgruppe, or mobilie killing units, which utilize
hermetically sealed trucks or vans to gas individuals not at concentration camps. Advanced
versions of gas chambers were built at Belzec, Sobidor, Treblinka, Sachsenhausen and most
infamously at Auschwitz. At the height of the war, while soldier deaths by gas were near zero,
upwards of 6,000 Jews were gassed at Auschwitz each day.12
Likewise, the Japanese had developed a CBW program. During the takeover of
Manchuria and through the pre-war period, Japan had been experimenting and developing CBWs
on par with the Western world’s stockpiles. Through the research of Ishii Shiro and Unit 731, as
well as several branch units, the Japanese military was able to test the effectiveness of various
dispersion methods and vectors for toxins such as botulinum, cholera, and the plague.13
Weaponization using gaseous or explosive forms, through the vectors of paper, plants and
animals, were all part of the studies of the Unit 731.14 But these tests were typically done to
prisoners of war, civilians and dissidents in one of a number of prisons, such as Zhong Ma.
Japanese confidence in the weapons waivered after failed battlefield uses against Soviet
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incursions on the Manchurian border.15 But word of this development spread and necessitated
that the Japanese also relinquish rights of first use on these weapons, in accord with the Geneva
Protocols.
Additionally, the U.S. had not halted its development of chemical arms despite its
abstinence from the war. Further stockpiling of mustard, chlorine, and diphosgene gases
continued for the U.S. during the early phases of the war. While the U.S. sought to abstain from
the war and to limit helping any belligerent party, it was still prepared to utilize unconventional
arms where necessary. But Roosevelt made his intentions known that he would maintain the
existing policy of “no-first-use” that resulted from the experiences of World War I.16 Reiterating
his commitment to the Geneva Protocols and Washington Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt
stated in 1937:
Authoritative reports are reaching this Government of the use by Japanese armed
forces in various localities of China of poisonous or noxious gases. I desire to
make it unmistakably clear that if Japan persists in this inhumane form of warfare
against China or against any other of the United Nations, such action will be
regarded by this Government as thought taken against the United States, and
retaliation in kind and in full measure will be meted out. We shall be prepared to
enforce complete retribution. Upon Japan will rest the responsibility.17

Similar statements were made toward the rest of the Axis powers in 1943 when Roosevelt
warned Italy and Germany that
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The use of such weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized
mankind. This country has not used them, and I hope we never will be compelled
to use them. I state categorically that we shall in no circumstances resort to the
use such weapons unless the first use of them is by our enemies…. I want to make
clear beyond all doubt to any of our enemies contemplating resort to such
desperate and barbarous methods that acts of this nature committed against any
one of the United Nations will be regarded as having been committed against the
United States itself and will be treated accordingly. 18

This made the U.S. position toward chemical and biological armaments clear. They were
not to be tools of first use. They were inhumane and caused undo and uncontrollable
suffering. As Roosevelt told Leahy, chemical weapons “violate every Christian ethic I
have ever heard of and all of the laws of war.”19 However, the U.S. was still willing to
use them during this existential war if the condition that battlefield use by enemies
occurred. Temptations for both Roosevelt and his successor Truman would call into
question how the U.S. would react to severe losses, situations of expediency and a breach
of the rules by a belligerent party. Two such opportunities presented themselves for
CBW warfare late in the war.
The first of these opportunities was the D-Day operation at Normandy. Fearing
that the Germans might initiate the use of gas as means of holding Allied forces to the
beachhead, it was thought by some that pre-emptive self-defense might be the only way
to succeed. This position was especially true of some of the British commanders and
Winston Churchill in communication with the Americans during the planning of the
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Normandy invasion. In letters to the American members of the Joint Command, the
British argued that “it is better to break our word [within the Geneva Protocol] than to
lose the British Empire.”20 Churchill would have his scientists and military men study
the possibility of using chemical and biological agents on the beachhead against the
immobile gunner towers of the Germans. His position, as expressed to his subordinates,
was this: “…it may be several weeks or even months before I shall ask you to drench
Germany with poison gas, and if we do it, let us do it one hundred percent.”21 Likewise,
American forces investigated a possible use of chemical arms to take the beachhead or to
stall enemy reinforcements, given the favorable weather for the landing site and
immobility of the opposing forces in their bunkers. Together, the British and American
forces began to manufacture a biological bomb, codenamed N, to be used for this
occasion. Supplies of mustard and other gases, as well as anthrax made by the British,
were built up and moved into position in case the reports came back favorably.22 This
was done in spite of Roosevelt’s position that no first use would occur, but out of the
possibility that gas may be needed in response to an offensive use of gas by the
Germans.23 In a statement issued to the press, Roosevelt stated
From time to time since the present war began there have been reports that one or
more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplating use of poisonous or
noxious gases or other inhuman devices of warfare. I have been loath to believe
that any nation, even our present enemies, could or would be willing to loose
20

Winston Churchill, “Most Secret Minutes to the Chiefs of Staff,” 6 July 1944.

21

Ibid.

22

Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman. A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret History of Chemical and Biological
Weapons (New York: Random House, 2002): 100; 107-119.
“The British Embassy to the Department of State,” 22 April 1943, FRUS: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, General, Vol.
1, Doc. 414.
23

80
upon mankind such terrible and inhumane weapons. However, evidence that the
Axis powers are making significant preparations indicative of such an intention is
being reported with increasing frequency from a variety of sources. Use of such
weapons has been outlawed by the general opinion of civilized mankind. This
country has not used them, and I hope that we never will be compelled to use
them. I state categorically that we shall under no circumstances resort to the use
of such weapons unless they are first used by our enemies… We promise to any
perpetrators of such crimes full and swift retaliation in kind… Any use of gas by
any Axis power, therefore, will immediately be followed by the fullest
retaliation…24
A month-long stall on the beachhead of Normandy proved to be a serious test for
first use restraint by the Allied forces, who were well outnumbered and lacked the high
ground needed to take the beach. Despite favorable circumstances and a high probability
of success, Roosevelt and his Supreme Commander Eisenhower were steadfast in the
belief that conventional forces alone would be necessary and that gas should be used in
response to German first use. It was their opinion, as expressed to the service members
involved in the Normandy Invasion, that
The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans great defeats… Our air
offensive has seriously reduced their strength… Our Home Fronts have given us
an overwhelming superiority in weapons and munitions of war, and placed at our
disposal great reserves… The tide has turned!... I have full confidence in your
courage, devotion to duty and skill in battle. We will accept nothing less than full
victory!25
There was no longer a need to consider use of unconventional weapons as
conventional munitions and tactics would be more than enough secure the day.
Moreover, the Germans had not used chemical weapons first, thereby eliminating a
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punitive return of fire by the Allied forces. This was in accordance with Roosevelt’s
personal belief that these weapons were “inhumane” and “outlawed by the general
opinion of civilized mankind.” Instead, CBWs as a first use weapon were set aside
during the planning phases of the operation in favor of conventional bombing runs to
disrupt enemy transports while using brute force and “heavy aerial bombardments” to
limit German reinforcements and take the beachhead.26 The only way that CBWs would
become involved in the invasion is if Germany used them first to stop the amphibious
assault. As a result, orders were issued through the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic
Fleet to armed forces that the policy for chemical weapons pertaining to the invasion
would be this:
Use of toxic gas will not be initiated by any United States commander.
Instructions and training should be undertaken to insure that retaliation if
authorized will be effective however in precaution against initiating use of gas
under stress. Offensive materials are to be kept in ready reserve but not issues to
combatant units. Higher echelons will be kept advised by BUCRD regarding
availability of materials.27
The order to issue the use of these weapons never happened though. Instead, reliance on
heavy artillery and even bombing runs, which would harm civilians, was the maximum
degree of force the Allies deemed necessary to advance on the German artillery. Thus,
while costly to Allied forces, CBWs were restrained once more, in spite of their probable
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utility and some internal factions arguing in favor of their use. The unacceptability of
CBWs as a first use weapon maintained.
The second and most publicly supported opportunity came as the war progressed
and it appeared that the Japanese were unwilling to surrender. With Roosevelt’s passing,
Truman came into office and was not as morally convinced that CBWs were not to be
used except in extreme circumstances. His take, and that of a majority of Americans as
evidenced by racist outcries and newspaper headlines, was that it would be permissible to
invoke gas warfare against the Japanese. This was on two grounds: first, they had
already broken the war convention by using these weapons against the Chinese and
second, they had performed a sneak attack, denoting themselves as “uncivilized” or
“barbarous” combatants.28 Additionally, the costliness of combat in the Pacific front,
totaling 13,000 casualties in Saipan and 25,000 casualties in Iwo Jima, necessitated a reevaluation of policy toward unconventional weapons before reaching the Japanese
mainland.29 As recounted during interrogations by the Chemical Warfare Service after
the losses at Iwo Jima,
Another well-informed Japanese officer stated that the use of mustard against
Japanese troops on islands such as Iwo Jima would have reduced US casualties
very considerably, and the Japanese forces would probably have been decimated
to the point where American decontamination groups could have gone ashore and
decontaminated the areas prior to debarkation of the main body of troops.30
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Given this, Chemical Warfare Services and Generals Marshall and Stilwell of the JCS felt
that a re-evaluation of opportunities and benefits of chemical warfare were necessary.
Questions of preparedness for retaliation turned to questions of initiation of gas warfare.
The JCS determined that a stockpile of munitions would be moved to the region in
preparation for any operations necessitating gas warfare, including invasion of Kyushu in
Operation OLYMPIC. Plans by the U.S. were made for possible chemical weapons
attacks against the Japanese as the war ended, as it was determined by the JCS that such
an attack was feasible and would be effective; however, such an initial attack would not
acceptable to Truman or the Allied forces.31 The only acceptable use of chemical
weapons in Japan would be “to conduct retaliatory gas warfare.”32
It was later revealed that even the estimate of feasibility was proven wrong by the
CWS, which noted that the planes in the region would be unable to carry such payloads
and using the CBW stockpiles available for an offensive would limit the ability of
retaliatory responses.33 However, the most significant limitations to operationalizing a
CBW attack on Japan in 1945 were two-fold. First was the existing agreement with
China about such attacks. It had been agreed that even in the instance of a retaliatory
attack, the U.S. would have to seek approval from China, which morally disapproved of
such an attack based on its treatment by Japan during the early stages of the war. Truman
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sought to avoid angering his allies in the region because of this.34 Second, and more
importantly, Truman’s administration had a different weapon developing which they
believed would meet the international standards for proportionality and humaneness
while still being conventional in nature. That weapon in question was the atomic bomb,
the result of six years of scientific development to create a larger explosive device meant
to cow ones enemies.35 Given the availability of an alternative method of victory, it was
thought that breaching the laws of war to perform offensive gas attacks was unnecessary.
The larger question then became did the atomic bomb breach the laws of proportionality,
discrimination and last resort as U.S. decision-makers understood their situation?

The Manhattan Project

Beginning in the late 1800s, physicists had been experimenting with radiological material
and the atomic particles that make up each compound. The use of uranium, polonium, radium,
and beryllium had become common place and shooting these particles into one another so that
they would break apart, releasing neutrons or electrons, was on the cutting edge of physics. The
question was what would happen if an atom of fissionable material were split?
The answer to that question came from the works of Dr. Leo Szilard in the 1930s.
Szilard had studied the work of Fermi and was convinced that when atomic particles are split,
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they release mass amounts of energy. Moreover, when you have multiple splits occurring at
once or causing one another, the resulting chain reaction would result in explosive outbursts of
energy. It was hypothesized that such energy could be captured in the form of reactors to power
regions. Alternatively, Szilard also thought that the energy from chain reactions could be
weaponized, placed into bombs to create explosions greater than even the largest conventional
arms of the time. At the time, this discovery would largely be ignored, though Szilard would
take out several patents between 1933 and 1936 which could have been used to build parts of an
atomic bomb. The British government saw fit to buy these particular patents but did not act on
them.36
It wouldn’t be until 1938 when Otto Hahn and Fritz Strassmann formally discovered and
tested the process of fission, the same process Szilard hypothesized years earlier, that the atomic
possibilities would be realities. Hahn and Strassmann were German radiochemists who had use
uranium to demonstrate the effects of fission in a controlled environment.37 The resulting paper
created quite a stir in the world of physics, catching the eyes of Fermi, Szilard and Einstein
among others. Within minutes of reading the Hahn-Strassmann findings, Einstein realized the
potential capabilities that could come from this discovery. In conjunction with Szilard in 1939,
Einstein wrote to Roosevelt stating
Certain aspects of the situation which has arisen seem to call for watchfulness
and, if necessary, quick action on the part of the Administration… it may be
possible to set up a nuclear chain reaction in a large mass of uranium by which
vast amounts of power and large quantities of new radium-like elements would be
36
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generated… This phenomenon would also lead to the construction of bombs, and
it is conceivable – though much less certain – that extremely powerful bombs of a
new type may thus be constructed.38

While the science denoted the possibility of both peaceful and wartime advents, Einstein
cautiously warned that, “I understand that Germany has actually stopped the sale of uranium
from the Czechoslovakian mines which has she has taken over.”39 The veiled warning shows a
fear that these bombs could be developed by overseas powers first, thereby threatening American
security. Roosevelt took this threat and opportunity seriously, establishing the Advisory
Committee on Uranium in conjunction with a committee headed by trusted advisor Alexander
Sachs. The two committees agreed that funding for uranium-based research was required but
research was to remain quiet.40
Initial funding and results were unimpressive. The funding was minimal and the
capacities for creating self-generating or secondary neutron reaction piles capable of nuclear
fission were limited. The scientists working on the projects, such as Fermi, thought there was a
low likelihood of success resulting from the level of research and funding available. But once
World War II formally began, the National Defense Research Committee was established,
reorganizing the former committees under their banner and gaining additional funding for future
research. An initial review of developments occurred in 1941 by Arthur Compton. Compton
estimated that it a large enough self-generating pile would not be developed and weaponized
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until 1945 at the earliest, indicating that more research was necessary before a bomb could be
utilized.41 However, the resulting disappointment from Compton’s report would be put to the
wayside when the MAUD Committee report came out in 1941. Based on the estimates from
Peierls and Frisch’s work, the MAUD report determined that even a 10 kilogram pile would
cause massive damage and could be loaded on a plane by 1943.42 Roosevelt gave Compton and
the committee the go ahead to develop these weapons further in January 1942, just one month
after the Japanese strike on Pearl Harbor and the U.S. formal entry into World War II.
Reorganized once more into the S-1 Committee under the head of the Army and the Office of
Scientific Research and Development, the researchers were given a $30 million budget and
charged with development of bombs in short order.43
Shortly afterward, the Army Corps of Engineers established the Manhattan Engineer
District, the unit of scientists spread through several facilities to develop and weaponize the selfgenerating piles as quickly as possible. Sites were established in Manhattan (New York), Oak
Ridge (Tennessee), Hanford (Washington), and Los Alamos (New Mexico), all of which
reported to Brigadier General Leslie Groves and Secretary of War Henry Stimson. By December
of 1942, Fermi’s independent team in Chicago builds the first self-sustained nuclear chain
reaction pile. The results are immediately influential on the development of piles of plutonium
and uranium at Oak Ridge and Hanford. Roosevelt, advised by Groves and the Lewis
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Committee report, then establishes the Manhattan Project on December 28, 1942.44 The race for
the bomb was on and the end was in sight.
The Manhattan Project had a strict secrecy clearance though. It was not governed by the
typical rules or political considerations. Each part of the project was compartmentalized to
certain facility: fissionable material development to Oak Ridge and Hanford, theoretical
scientific development to Manhattan, and testing to Los Alamos. Most people at the former
facilities did not know that successful bombs had been developed until after the bombing of
Hiroshima. Groves maintained the final say on all development. The Project was charged with
developing the bomb by 1945 as Compton had estimated was possible, though some doubted that
timeline was realistic. Robert Oppenheimer, head of the Los Alamos facility, thought that more
fissionable material was necessary for the creation of a bomb than what was available. Other
members simply paled at the prospect of such an engineering feat even being possible. With the
ends questionable and the science still exploratory at best, the teams trudged on as quickly as
they could to meet their deadline while the war raged on.45
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The Path to the Trinity Test

Between 1942 and July 1945, the U.S. became deeply involved in the war on multiple
fronts. Casualties and cost mounted while confidence in victory began to be questioned. Several
major events forced the Manhattan Project team to push up its deadline, despite the lack of
knowledge about the bombs being developed. These events also resulted in an on-going
question: if a bomb could be developed, who would be the target and what would the conditions
be to necessitate its use?
U.S. forces became heavily involved in the European and North African fronts, given the
fear that German scientists may be well be far advanced in their progress toward a bomb which
could be used against the Allied powers. Bombings of German cities by U.S. and U.K. aerial
crews became commonplace to put increased pressure on the Germans to withdraw from
previously held areas. Allied forces successfully capture Italy and turn it against its former Axis
allies in 1943 with the larger goal of recapturing France and pushing the Germans inside their
own borders. This becomes the goal of the Normandy operation in 1944, which used 160,000
Allied troops to forge a path to Paris. Between the start of the operation in July and its end in
late August, Allied troops landed two million men on the beachhead and lost 226,000. The
Germans lost an estimated 240,000 men. Further pushes were made for the German border, with
increased bombing raids as 1944 progressed.46
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However, this positive progress on the European front did not assuage the minds of those
working on the Manhattan Project. It was still feared that the Germans were close to developing
a bomb. As Groves explained it,
Unless and until we had positive knowledge to the contrary [that the Germans had
failed to develop a bomb], we had to assume that the most competent German
scientists and engineers were working on an atomic program with the full support
of their government and with the full capacity of German industry at their
disposal. Any other assumption would have been unsound and dangerous.47

Unbeknownst to Groves and the other scientists involved in the U.S. project, the German
attempts at gaining a nuclear weapon were halted in 1942 after repeated failure and
disorganization. The prospect of German nuclear failure became more likely as 1945 progressed
and the Germans saw the Allies come right to their borders on all sides. Encircled on all sides by
April 1945, the Germans had lost. On April 30, 1945, Hitler dies and the Germans surrender on
May 7th. But the war does not end for the U.S. and neither does the development of the bomb.
On top of the fighting in the European theatre, 1942 through 1944 saw the U.S. embroiled
in island-hopping warfare with the Japanese in the Pacific theatre of the war. Battles for the
Philippines, Coral Sea, Java Sea, Midway Island, Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Tarawa, Saipan,
Guam, Tinian Island, Iwo Jima and Manila comprise this timeframe. The battles are extreme in
nature, with the Japanese utilizing kamikaze as well as bunker warfare to attempt to hold back
the U.S. advance. U.S. tactics also advanced steadily, from base aerial and ground warfare to the
use of flamethrowers to burn the enemy out of holes. Instances of brutality by the Japanese in
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cases such as the Butaan Death March were met with massive Allied force use in cases such as
the firebombing of Tokyo. Casualties were incredibly high for both sides, but neither would give
in. Combat casualties for the U.S. topped 111,000 while the Japanese suffered an estimated 1.7
million combatant deaths.48
During this time, breakthroughs were made by the Manhattan Project group. Selfgenerating piles and enough fissile material had become available to build bombs. Additionally,
Roosevelt was no longer president, having passed. Truman became the man with the final say to
a weapon he had previously not known may exist. It was not brought to his attention until April
24, 1945 by Secretary of War Stimson.49 However, as it was presented to him by Stimson and
Groves, the bombs being developed were simply enhanced explosive devices of a conventional
nature but fueled by atomic particles, to which Truman had no aversion in use. He gave the goahead to continue progress and testing in Los Alamos.
By July 1945, Oppenheimer and Groves had built what they believe would be a workable
bomb for testing. The bomb, codenamed “Gadget,” was a steel globe shaped implosion
plutonium bomb measuring between 15 and 20 kilotons.50 Admittedly, none involved in the test
on July 16th knew what would happen or even if the test bomb would explode. The science was
rushed, as was the engineering of the explosive ordinance. For all they knew, nothing would
happen when the timer reached zero. As the second-in-command, Brigadier General Thomas
Farrell noted that everyone was praying for success, otherwise the last several years of work
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would have been for naught. The timer finally reached zero, Oppenheimer gave the command to
commence the test and a massive explosion flared up in the distance. Observers were knocked
down from the sheer force of the blast, even in the shelter. A blinding light was followed by the
visible tower of fire and smoke, finally after a short time forming into a mushroom could that cut
the other clouds from the sky and shone the sun over its top.51 Enrico Fermi, one of the
physicists in the command room, remarked
About 40 seconds after the explosion, the air blast reached me. I tried to estimate
its strength by dropping from about six feet small pieces of paper before, during
and after the passage of the blast wave. Since, at the time, there was no wind, I
could observe very distinctly and actually measure the displacement of the pieces
of paper that were in the process of falling while the blast was passing. The shift
was about 2.5 meters, which, at the time, I estimated to correspond to the blast
that would be produced by ten thousand tons of T.N.T.52

The test was a success but the immediate reactions were mixed. Shock and awe filled the
bunker. Stunned silence before slow congratulations were given. As Edward McMillan
explained, “The whole spectacle was so tremendous and one might almost say fantastic that the
immediate reaction of the watchers was one of awe rather than excitement. After some minutes
of silence, a few people made remarks like, ‘Well, it works,’ and then conversation and
discussion became general.” While Groves and Dr. Bush were both proud of the results, others
were less impressed or even outright concerned. Joseph Kanon remarked, “This was the real
secret. Annihilation. Nothing else.” Isidor Rabi stated that “It looked menacing… A new thing
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had just been born; a new control; a new understanding of man, which man had acquired over
nature.” Kenneth Bainbridge noted that “No one would saw it could forget it, a foul and
awesome display.” Greisen observed that he those around him were “all much more shaken up
by the shot mentally than physically.”53
But most telling were Frank and Robert Oppenheimer’s immediate impressions. As the
lead scientists on the project, they had the most vested interest in success. However, they were
immediately frightened by the results. Frank Oppenheimer remarked,
And so there was this sense of this ominous cloud hanging over us. It was so
brilliant purple, with all the radioactive glowing. And it just seemed to hang there
forever. Of course it didn’t. It must have been just a very short time until it went
up. It was very terrifying.54

Meanwhile, Robert Oppenheimer famously stated this in reaction to the test:
We knew the world would be the same. A few people laughed, a few people
cried, most were silent. I remembered the line from the Hindu scripture, the
Bhagavad-Gita. Vishnu is trying to persuade the Prince that he should do his duty
and to impress him takes on his multi-armed form and says, ‘Now, I am become
Death, the destroyer of worlds.’ I suppose we all felt that one way or another.55

The reaction is telling. Despite pride in their work, in the success and advancement of science,
in the assurance of security for America, there was doubt. There was concern of a moral nature
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of the weapon they had just completed. There was a measure of distrust by some who worked
closely on the finished product. This would not be the only instance of questioning what was to
come next – the first wartime use of the first atomic bomb.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

By May of 1945, the U.S. had forged a path all the way to the Japanese islands. Having
gained a foothold in Okinawa, the question became how much longer the Japanese would fight.
By this time, the Germans had surrendered. The Japanese had lost their major allies and were
fighting alone. However, they were entrenched; their soldiers and civilians intermingled in close
proximity and both having the same mindset: failure to repel the Americans would result in
absolute loss. Meanwhile, the U.S. had presented the Japanese with only two options at Potsdam
as a result of the successful testing of the Gadget bomb: be destroyed or surrender
unconditionally.56 The latter option was unacceptable to the Japanese, while the former option
was unwanted by U.S. military strategists so long as it involved conventional invasion tactics.
As Truman put it in his memoirs, an invasion of the Japanese islands would have led to between
500,000 and one million American casualties, something that would be totally unacceptable in
order to achieve a decisive victory.57 As such, a third, less costly but equally effective method
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was needed. Coincidentally, the U.S. had just succeeding in creating such an option: the atomic
bomb.
General Groves and Secretary of State James Byrnes both favored the option of the bomb
and held special sway with Truman such that he assented to the preparation of plans for atomic
bomb use. Two bombs were put under development, codenamed Little Boy and Fat Man. Little
Boy was to be a uranium-based gun bomb with a payload of 15 kilotons. Fat Man was a
plutonium-based implosion bomb, similar to Gadget, the bomb tested at Trinity. Fat Man would
have a payload of 20 kilotons with a weapon’s efficiency score approximately 10 times that of
Little Boy.58 The plan being built by military advisors would call for two bombing runs, one on
the city of Hiroshima and the other aimed just days later at either Kokura, Kyoto or Niigata
dependent upon weather. As luck would have it, the latter bomb’s target would change the day
of the bombing to Nagasaki due to weather. When presented with these options on July 16,
1945, Truman again agreed to move forward with dropping the bomb.59
It is important to note that the bombs in development lacked precision in their capacity
though. The rushed designs and the novelty of the atomic bomb did not leave time to design
targeting or control elements. Instead, the bombs would detonate upon impact after being
dropped from the payload bay of B-29 bombers. It was known that civilians, as well as soldiers,
would be the targets of these weapons. But the intensity of the war in the Pacific, along with the
latent feelings that the Japanese had caused undo harm to the American homeland and breeched
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the peace first, left lingering resentment and a loosened feeling toward the rules of war. One
historian notes that the rules of war were hanging on a by a thread, resulting in a “redefinition of
morality” that made the atomic bombing possible.60 But in the pursuit of absolute victory, it
appears that Truman and his primary advisors believed that absolute means were necessary.
That is not to say that everyone was in agreement with this plan. General George
Marshall advocated that there needed to be more defined military targets to attack. Moreover,
civilians needed to be warned that such a massive explosive was about to used so as to give them
time to flee.61 Naval advisors thought that victory could be achieved through conventional
bombing and blockades. The undersecretary for the Navy, Ralph Bard, even went so far as to
invoke the American moral tradition as a “great humanitarian nation” as to why the bomb should
not fall.62 Admiral William Leahy likened the atomic bomb to gas warfare, a barbarous weapon
that was not to be used.63 Even Secretary of War Henry Stimson expressed doubt in the need to
use such a weapon. He argued that he “did not want to have the United States acquire the
reputation for outdoing Hitler in atrocities.” Instead, there was a need for “fair play and
humanitarianism… The same rule of sparing the civilian population should be applied as far as
possible in the use of any new weapon.”64 While these voices of dissent did not hold back the
bombs from falling, they did add an intermediary step – the need for approval from the scientific
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community of the Interim Committee before atomic bombs could be used. The bombs were
simply enhanced explosions and any fear of radiation was unnecessary. This approval was given
by Oppenheimer, Fermi and Compton so that the goals of the President and the U.S. could be
accomplished but it was not without noting that the community was divided. “The opinions of
our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous,” Oppenheimer
writes.65 And that is indeed true, as Szilard was able to get 68 of the scientists directly involved
in the Manhattan Project to sign a petition for non-use on the grounds of the pure destructive and
immoral nature of the very thing they had created.
While the advocacy to avoid using the bomb altogether fell on deaf ears, it was not
completely ignored, as evidenced by the need to release a scientific statement in conjunction
with the President’s statement acknowledging the dropping of the first bomb. On August 6,
Little Boy fell on Hiroshima. The destruction was beyond all expectation. Everything for one
mile from the drop site was destroyed, even buildings meant to withstand earthquakes. Mass
distortion of steel buildings was observed up to 4,500 feet from the drop site. Roughly 60,000 of
the 90,000 buildings were destroyed or severely damaged, with heavy fires raging up to 6,000
feet away from the bomb site. The air blast radius was 60,000 feet from the drop site. Of the
255,000 people in the city of Hiroshima, an estimated 66,000 died while another 69,000 were
injured. On impact, 7,505 were killed immediately, resulting in a 93% mortality rate within the
one mile radius from the impact zone. While these numbers are technically lower than the
casualties resulting from the fire-bombing of Tokyo, the rapidity with which they occurred and
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indiscriminate manner of targeting make an immediate impact on decision-makers.66 In the prewritten statement accompanying the Truman’s recognition of the use of the bomb, the bomb was
portrayed as still being simply a large conventional bomb. As Truman put it,
Sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one bomb on Hiroshima, an important
Japanese Army base. That bomb had more power than 20,000 tons of T.N.T. It had more
than two thousand times the blast power of the British “Grand Slam” which is the largest
bomb ever yet used in the history of warfare.67
However, based on the results of Hiroshima, several things changed quickly for the U.S.
in decisions concerning atomic bombs. First, the Japanese filed a formal complaint with the
Swiss Legation team to be given to the U.S. consulate. Therein, the Japanese invoked the type of
horror and destruction caused by the bombing of Hiroshima. The communication read
On August 6, 1945, American airplanes released on the residential district of the town of
Hiroshima bombs of a new type, killing and injuring in one second a large number of
civilians and destroying a great part of the town… This bomb, provided with a parachute,
in falling has a destructive force of a great scope as a result of its explosion in the air. It
is evident, therefore, that it is technically impossible to limit the effect of its use to special
targets… and the American authorities are perfectly aware of this. In fact, it has been
established on the scene that the damage extends over a great area and that combatant and
non-combatant men and women, old and young, are massacred without discrimination…
It is an elementary principle of international public law that in time of war the
belligerents do not have unlimited right in choice of the means of attack and that they
cannot resort to projectile arms or any other means capable of causing the enemy
needless suffering… Since the beginning of the present war, the American government
has declared on various occasions that the use of gas or other inhuman means of combat
were considered illegal in the public opinion of civilized human societies and that it
would not avail itself of the these means before enemy countries resorted to them. The
bombs in question, used by the Americans, by their cruelty and by their terrorizing
effects, surpass by far gas or any other arm the use of which is prohibited by the treaties
for the reasons of their characteristics.68
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These admonitions were accepted by the President and JCS, but did not receive a direct response.
The arguments of the Japanese mirrored the reconnaissance of the Americans in terms of
understanding what damage had been caused and to whom. As a result, the Japanese were given
notice of the impending second bomb so as to minimize the impact on non-combatants as much
as possible. Leaflets were dropped on Japanese cities which invoked the need to flee. They
stated
America asks that you take immediate heed of what we say on this leaflet. We
are in possession of the most destructive explosive ever devised by man. A single
one of newly developed atomic bombs is actually the equivalent in explosive
power to what 2000 of our giant B-29’s can carry on a single mission… If you
still have any doubt, make inquiry as to what happened to Hiroshima when just
one atomic bomb fell on that city… You should take steps now to cease military
resistance… EVACUATE YOUR CITIES.69
Another version of the leaflets dropped on the same cities read
Read this carefully as it may save your life or the life of a relative or friend. In the
next few days, some or all of the cities named on the reverse side will be
destroyed by American bombs. These cities contain military installations and
workshops or factories which produce military goods. We are determined to
destroy all of the tools of the military clique which they are using to prolong this
useless war. But, unfortunately, bombs have no eyes. So, in accordance with
America's humanitarian policies, the American Air Force, which does not wish to
injure innocent people, now gives you warning to evacuate the cities named and
save your lives. America is not fighting the Japanese people but is fighting the
military clique which has enslaved the Japanese people. The peace which
America will bring will free the people from the oppression of the military clique
and mean the emergence of a new and better Japan. You can restore peace by
demanding new and good leaders who will end the war. We cannot promise that
only these cities will be among those attacked but some or all of them will be, so
heed this warning and evacuate these cities immediately.70
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A change in the legitimacy and necessity of certain targets given the sheer destructive
potential was apparent to the administration and military alike. Additionally, during Truman’s
press announcement of the bombing of Hiroshima, he closed the release with this statement
I shall recommend that the Congress of the United States consider promptly the
establishment of an appropriate commission to control the production and use
atomic power within the United States. I shall give further consideration and
make further recommendations to the Congress as to how atomic power can
become a powerful and forceful influence towards the maintenance of world
peace.71

Almost immediately, the urge to limit use or to confine the damages associated with use becomes
obvious and necessary, but not before one more parting shot is made on Nagasakai on August
9th. Again, the result is mass destruction and casualties. A blinding light, a blast of air and a ball
of flame take with it 64,000 lives and all but 12% of the buildings in the city. The rapidity of
strikes without the time for re-evaluation and interpretation of the resulting data was caused by
the initial order to use the atomic bomb, which stated that bombing runs would be timed in
accordance with the ability to create such weapons. This meant that approximately one or two
runs could be made every other week.
Despite this, it is believed that Truman was surprised by the rapidity of the second strike.
He thought there would be time between the attacks to assess further need of the bomb and to
determine its effects in a way that testing had not yet been able to do. In a letter to Richard
Russell, Truman wrote
I know that Japan is a terribly cruel and uncivilized nation in warfare but I can’t
bring myself to believe that, because they are beasts, we should ourselves act in
71
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the same manner. For myself, I certainly regret the necessity of wiping out whole
populations because of the ‘pigheadedness’ of the leaders of a nation and, for your
information, I am not going to do it unless it is absolutely necessary… My
objective is to save as many American lives as possible but I also have a humane
feeling for the women and children in Japan.72

He reiterated these emotions in another letter to Samuel Cavert days later, in which he wrote,
“Nobody is more disturbed over the use of Atomic bombs than I am.”73 It took Truman less than
a week to reconsider the conventionality of the bombs he once thought of as enhanced
explosives. They were something else altogether, something more deadly, dangerous and
indiscriminate. As Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace writes, when faced with the option of
a third bomb, Truman found himself unable to pull the trigger again. “He didn’t like the idea of
killing, as he said, ‘all those kids.”74 Truman himself would later remark, “We were not ready to
make use of this weapon against the Japanese, although we did not know as yet what effect the
new weapon might have, physically or psychologically, when used against the enemy.”75
Following the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese did not break or
submit as expected. The gambit had hardened their resolve and fighting continued for
September 1945, despite the signal for surrender being made on August 10th after the bombing of
Nagasaki. But for the U.S., a return to conventional weapons and bombings was in order.
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Despite urgings from Groves and Byrnes, no more bombs fell as the war in the Pacific theatre
drew to a close.

Domestic and International Reactions

In the aftermath of the war, the focus quickly shifted from winning to a question of what
comes next for the bomb. Two strains of action flow out of the events at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki – one on a domestic level and the other on an international level. Both mirror one
another in that there was general agreement that the atomic bomb should not be used again.
On the domestic side, the U.S. began immediate re-evaluation of the necessity and effect
of Little Boy and Fat Man. In December 1945, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey was released.
The findings there resulted in greater questions about the legitimacy of the bomb. It was argued
that the bomb was overly destructive and did not achieve its goal of absolute victory, given that
further conventional bombings were necessary. Victory could have been achieved through
conventional means only.76 Meanwhile, public misgivings about the actions at Hiroshima and
Nagasaki mounted as the Federal Council of Churches and John Hersey of the New York Times
both printed stories and reactions to the bombings. Dubbed the “crime of Hiroshima and
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Nagasaki,” the American public began to fear the atomic bomb while forcing some like James
Conant to take up defense of the bombing.77
The scientific community released their own findings on the bombing in the Franck
report. Here, it was suggested that the atomic bomb, like gas warfare, would become illegitimate
as knowledge of its effects and disproportionate nature became commonplace.78 Arthur
Compton argued that the effects of radiation might mirror those of poison gas, thereby
delegitimizing the weapon for future use. Oppenheimer would make a similar comparison,
stating that he would work no more on the atomic bomb, as it was tantamount to perfecting
poison gas.79 As a result of questions about how this weapon might need further controls, the
U.S. developed the federal agency known as the Atomic Energy Commission. Congress
established the AEC with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and charged it with the regulation of
nuclear energy for both peace and war uses.80 It would be the primary source of scientific study
and development of use nuclear energy for years to come, until being renamed the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission in 1974. Effectively, the bomb had been taken out of the hands of
military leadership who were all too willing to legitimize its existence through further use and
placed in the hands of civilians and members of the executive bureaucracy. As Gaddis describes
it, “In this way, Truman took the first step toward building what has turned out to be one of the
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most important principles of postwar international relations: the idea that nuclear weapons differ
emphatically from all other weapons, and should be treated with corresponding respect.”81
Truman himself would further state his unwillingness to use atomic weapons over the
years. Despite a monopoly on the weapon and a threat of Soviet rival development, Truman
would forever be effected by his decision to use and the ramifications of that decision. At the
height of the Berlin Crisis in 1948, another opportunity to legitimize the bomb would occur.
Truman’s response is telling:
I don’t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to. It is a
terrible thing to order the use of something… that is so terribly destructive,
destructive beyond anything we have ever had. You have got to understand that
this isn’t a military weapon… It is used to wipe out women and children and
unarmed people, and not for military uses. So we have got to treat this differently
from rifles and cannons and ordinary things like that…82

He would reiterate this inability to use the bomb again in 1949. “This isn’t just another
weapon… not just another bomb.” When taking to David Lilienthal, AEC head, he added,
“Dave, we will never use it again if we can possibly help it.”83 This does not mean Truman was
opposed to all use, but that use would be a last resort in desperate times and in limited ways. He
had realized the errors in his calculations previously and sought to correct them in future atomic
weapons decisions.
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While resistance to future use on a domestic front occurred, the United Nations began to
pursue formal restraints on an international front. With the U.S. at the forefront, one of the first
moves made by the UN was to establish an international Atomic Energy Commission. Unlike its
domestic variation, the IAEC was to serve one purpose: “the elimination from national
armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction.”84
Within the IAEC was a disarmament body vested with the power to limit the spread of weapons
of mass destruction. Additionally, the General Assembly submitted annual resolutions that
called for a ban on nuclear weapons, though the U.S. and NATO allies began to push back on
that ban after the Soviets detonated their first bomb in 1949.85
Of special note though is the term “weapons of mass destruction.”86 While traditionally
associated with the IAEC and nuclear arms, the first use of the term was in association with
biological weapons. It quickly expanded to include all weapons of an unconventional nature.
These were weapons which were indiscriminate, disproportionate, and caused undo suffering to
their targets. Its first use came by Truman in the aftermath of the Hiroshima bombing while
writing to the Prime Ministers of Britain and Canada. There, it was written that the three would
work together to propose “eliminating from national armaments atomic weapons and all other
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction,” the phrasing which would show up in the goals of
the IAEC.87 The draft of the IAEC proposal came from Vannevar Bush and Sir John Anderson,
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who likened atomic and biological weapons. “We both thought that, while we were attempting
to bring reason to bear on one terrible weapon [atomic bombs], we might as well include another
that could be equally terrible, and might indeed have become so if the atomic bomb had not
taken center stage.”88 Bush also wrote that “devastating though the atomic bomb is, it does not
compare in horror with other weapons which we declined to use in war” such as germ and gas
weapons.89

Conclusions from World War II

This case portrays three major conclusions in the application of Just War norms to
unconventional weapons during World War II. First, there are the findings that support the idea
of chemical and biological weapons as being unconventional and therefore unusable in the
majority of wartime circumstances. Second, there is the complex history of the atomic bomb and
its linkages to the Just War tradition. Finally, there is the stark similarity between the patterns of
decision-making surrounding CBWs and atomic weapons which reinforce that the rules
surrounding their use are a shared logic.
In the case of CBWs, we see how the knowledge of effects gained during World War I
and the attempts to create formalized rules governing their use has in fact taken hold over the
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decision-making processes in war. CBWs are recognized by decision-makers as unconventional,
inhumane weapons which cause undo suffering in an indiscriminate way. No sides are willing to
be the first to use these weapons on the battlefield, though use by the Germans and Japanese
against civilian populations or prisoners of war still occurs. Even the U.S., who so adamantly
fought for some degree of exception given extraordinary or extreme necessity circumstances is
unwilling to use CBWs. This is despite the obvious utility in cases such as Normandy or when
striking the Japanese mainland in late 1945. Instead, they opt for other alternative routes or
methods, new technologies or trusted explosive ordinances. That is not to say that the U.S.
would have been totally unwilling to use, just that the conditions of retaliation or extreme
necessity never arose. That is a telling sign that the normative guidelines of discrimination,
proportionality, and supreme emergency provided by the Just War traditions had taken hold of
CBW decision-making. But it is equally telling that the U.S. replaced one unconventional
weapon with another when the time came.
As far as nuclear weapons, it is obvious from the rushed development, fear, and extreme
levels of casualties suffered that the U.S. felt it was in a state of supreme emergency. Note that
this is not to say such a state was truly in effect making the U.S.’s actions just, but simply that
Truman and his advisors felt such a state was in existence and that the rules of war were
loosened. Attacks on the U.S. mainland and atrocities committed by the Japanese, as well as a
civilian populace which had become intermingled with its armed soldiers, made for a loose
application of the discrimination principle in pursuit of proportionality given extreme
circumstances. A lack of thorough knowledge of the bomb resulted in an underestimation of its
truly destructive potential as well as the indiscriminate killing of entire cities. But it is
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worthwhile to note how many scientists, military men and policy-makers were concerned about
the bomb from its first testing onward. When even Oppenheimer and Einstein had changed their
assessments to show some degree of regret over the bomb’s development and use, which is a
telling sign that the weapon in question is somehow different from conventional arms.
Moreover, Truman’s immediate about-face on the possibility of further use and the way in which
he was haunted by the bomb’s indiscriminate nature show just quickly the tradition of future
non-use took hold for atomic weapons. This tradition was reinforced by domestic and
international structures, as well as rising fear of the bomb itself and its effects as compared to
other unconventional weapons.
A comparison between the trajectory of CBWs and atomic weapons resulting in them
being grouped together as unconventional armaments and “weapons of mass destruction” reveals
that the logics which apply to one weapon apply to all weapons of that classification. The
application of Just War norms to both CBWs and atomic arms mirrors one another and ends in a
deeply rooted, moralistic determination that such weapons are a class apart from conventional
explosives. Decision-making before, during and after the wars for each individual weapon go
through the same phases. First, there is a phase of doubt that the weapon is unconventional.
During the weapon’s first wartime use, the use is questioned on moral and legitimacy grounds
but ultimately still used on account of a lack of knowledge about the weapon’s effects and the
necessity of war. Retrospectively, those who use the weapon regret such use and begin to enact
limitations on when, how and against whom it may be used in the future. Both CBWs and
atomic weapons move through each of these phases and each are governed by the logics of
discrimination, proportionality, and supreme emergency. In the end, these weapons of mass
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destruction receive strict limitations on future uses that only under certain conditions will they
ever be used again. The question is, would those conditions of supreme emergency be met in
any future wars such that the world would see chemical, biological or atomic arms used once
more?

CHAPTER 5
NARROW MISSES IN KOREA

You boys must be crazy. We can’t use those awful things against Asians for a second time in less
than ten years. My God.
~ President Dwight Eisenhower, April 1954

It would not take the U.S. long to test its newfound restraint for unconventional weapons
as it would become embroiled in another war just 5 years after World War II ended. From 1950
to 1953, the United States became involved in international police action in Korea. North
Korean armed forces attempted to take over the Korean peninsula, expanding the communist
sphere. The U.S. and a U.N. joint military force came to the aid of the South Koreans. The joint
forces stopped the North Korean invasion and pushed the invaders back beyond the 38th Parallel.
However, in fall 1950, Chinese forces crossed the Yalu River into North Korea and reinforced
the North Koreans. What resulted was a territorial tug-of-war lasting over three years and ending
with an armistice that re-established the borders of North and South Korea at the 38th Parallel.
The Chinese and North Korean forces suffered 739,000 reported battle deaths, while the joint
U.S., U.N., and South Korean forces lost almost 171,000 soldiers. The U.S. lost 54,487 lives
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spanning the presidencies of Truman and Eisenhower.1 In total, nearly 5 million died with over
half of that number being civilian casualties from combat or malnourishment.
Despite the heavy losses, the war itself has been described by some a yo-yo of back and
forth combat. The result was a stalemate between the North and South and an indecisive
withdraw by joint U.S. and U.N. forces. It is the common opinion of strategists and academics
alike that the use of unconventional weapons, especially tactical nuclear strikes, would have
resulted in a decisive victory. But the U.S. was restrained in its use of any unconventional
weapon. Other authors have posited this was due to the heavy influence of a taboo on nuclear
arms especially, which has largely become the accepted explanation for non-use.
This chapter will investigate the consideration of policies to utilize unconventional
weapons, first nuclear and then biochemical, to see if they mirror what the taboo Constructivist
arguments say. If authors such as Tannenwald and Price are correct, the temptation to use these
weapons should be minimal and restraint should be unquestioned. However, the U.S. had plans
in place for specific instances of use and several thresholds which, if surpassed, could have
resulted in unconventional weapons seeing the field of battle once more. If the losses were too
high, the Soviets became directly involved, or there was the threat of absolute failure in
defending the peninsula, the U.S. military strategies are clear that use would have happened.
Weapons were mobilized and training runs were performed. In the end, it appears that a lack of
direct Soviet involvement and a growing concern with the legitimacy of the weapons were the
real reasons for non-use. This was in spite of major opportunities during the initial invasion and
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the retreat from the Yalu River in which use may have expedited victory or limited joint forces
casualties. The seriousness of the policy considerations and near miss show clearly that the
taboo logic fails in this case to accurately explain U.S. restraint.

The Truman Administration on Nuclear Arms

Leading up to the Korean War, the U.S. policy toward the Korean Peninsula was to
finance, arm and train the South Korean army so they could defend themselves.2 However, when
the North Koreans began to cross into South Korea in June 1950, Truman was presented with
two general courses of action for entering the Korean affair in the form of NSC 76/1. If only
North Korean forces were mobilized against South Korea, then the U.S. could enter in a limited
form utilizing the already available forces in the region. However, there was another alternative
which was focused on what happened if another major player became involved on behalf of the
North Koreans – the Soviets. NSC 76/1, the first meeting to discuss Korea, specifically focused
on this latter situation but seemed to hope for the former limited involvement being the reality of
the Korean War. That said, NSC 76 provided plans executing full-scale mobilization, which was
undefined, as a retaliatory resort against Soviet intervention. It is noteworthy that the president
would make the final decision on the meaning of “full-scale mobilization,” which should be done
after exhausting all other combat options and in conjunction with considerations of
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appropriateness per the United Nations and our allies.3 This ambiguity left the door open for
possible nuclear arms use from the beginning of U.S. involvement in Korea but did not explicitly
plan for dropping a bomb on North Korea.
That intermediary response was quickly abandoned by Truman and his advisors,
however, as a means of expediting the war and limiting chances of foreign intervention should
the Soviets become involved. On June 25th of 1950, Truman approved of preparations for the
use of nuclear armaments on Soviet air bases in the Far East if they became involved in Korea.
These plans were not concerned with the North Korean forces which had begun to push toward
Seoul.4 The Air Force was ordered to form a contingency plan and, in July, mobilized a feint
bomber force of B-29s. None were armed with nuclear weapons, but the planes were configured
so they could carry nuclear armaments if the need arose.5 These bombers never saw combat and
were subsequently recalled in fall of 1950. This recall was due to the major pushes that the joint
forces had made, having captured Pyongyang and pushed the North Korean forces back to the
Yalu River. Both President Truman and General MacArthur, the joint commander of the U.S.
and U.N. forces in Korea, were confident that the end was quickly in sight and peace would be
brought back to the peninsula with U.S. interests left wholly intact.
Unfortunately, this hubris would be tested in November 1950 as the troop drawback
would be met with the Chinese intervention on behalf of the North Koreans. Unbeknownst to

NSC Report 76/1, “U.S. Courses of Action in the Event Soviet Forces Enter Korean Hostilities,” 25 June 1950,
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/index.php [Accessed 14 December 2012].
3

“Memorandum of Conversation,” 25 June 1950, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/
study_collections/koreanwar/index.php [Accessed 14 December 2012].
4

5

Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1989), 113.

114
the joint forces, a large Chinese force had crossed the Yalu and were reinforcing the North
Koreans near Unsan. This situation forced reconsideration of using nuclear arms. Once the
Chinese became involved, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Plans and Operations Division
submitted new recommendations to Truman asking him to reconsider using tactical nuclear
weapons. Both groups provided that if China became fully involved in the fighting, then the
U.S. should consider using nuclear arms as a “decisive factor” against supply lines and troop
concentrations on the Manchurian border.6 While the U.S. and U.N. forces retreated from the
Yalu River region through the Kunu-ri Gauntlet back toward Seoul, Truman and his Air Force
Chief of Staff General Hoyt had two B-29s fully armed with tactical nuclear weapons prepared
for mobilization to the Far East.7 At the same time, MacArthur began to push for more
aggressive policies from Truman so that the war could be prosecuted in an effective manner.
MacArthur began to push for the destruction of bridges and enemy supply lines, providing for
legitimate strategic targets of nuclear armaments.8
Truman did not give in to MacArthur’s demands for further nuclear mobilization, nor did
he entertain the notion of dropping the bomb. In fact, it appears that Truman was more sensitive
to international attitudes than MacArthur’s perceived necessity. When Truman misspoke on
November 30th, 1950 and gave the impression that nuclear weapons use was on a legitimate
option, the world replied in a united voice.9 British Prime Minister Attlee, Indian Prime Minister
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Nehru plus other ambassadors and world leaders let Truman know their opinions on the matter.
Most viewed the use of nuclear weapons in Korea as immoral, horrific, and a travesty that should
not happen.10 The same response about the inappropriateness of nuclear armaments came from
inside the United States, most prominently from Dean Acheson.11 Ultimately, this outpouring of
opinions resulted in the decision that unless it was absolutely necessary, the bomb would not be
used in Manchuria or Korea.12
Even after affirming that the limited circumstances for nuclear weapons use, MacArthur
continued to push Truman to involve the bomb in Korea. In January of 1951, MacArthur went
so far as to request that thirty-four atomic bombs be brought to Korea for use on twenty-six
strategic targets. The Joint Chiefs denied his request and reaffirmed Truman and the world’s
point of view – the war in Korea need not become a major war.13 MacArthur then released a
unilateral threat to destroy China should they become further involved stating:
My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s
entry into war against us in Korea… follow the conventional pattern of meeting force
with maximum counter-force as we have never failed to do in the past… There is no
substitute for victory.14
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Fear of involving the Soviets or further dragging the Chinese into the conflict was a
serious consideration; it was generally perceived by Truman and his advisors that using nuclear
arms or “maximum counter-force” as MacArthur put it would do just that.15 Regardless of
MacArthur’s advice, Truman remained firm in his belief that nuclear weapons should not be
used in Korea. Over the course of 1951, the Joint Forces performed their counteroffensive
against the North Korean and Chinese forces. Victories were claimed at the battle of the Twin
Tunnels, Chipyong, Wonsan, Seoul, and the Hwachon Reservoir. Two major offensives by the
Chinese forces were repelled successfully during this time as well, which fed into Truman’s
belief that conventional warfare was all that was needed for victory to be achieved. However,
MacArthur continued to push for nuclear arms to achieve strategic victories and end the war
immediately, which Truman did not accept as necessary. His ultimate affirmation of
unwillingness to win at all costs by using any means necessary came in removing MacArthur
from command in the Far East in 1951 and replacing him with General Ridgeway.
Truman’s belief was maintained through the end of his term in 1952, as he sought to
avoid the expansion of the war by making nuclear arms a last resort. Between 1950 and 1953,
Truman advised his administration and military officials that there was a distinct difference
between conventional weapons like bombs and bullets and unconventional weapons, such as
nuclear devices and CBWs.16 These weapons were a threat to international stability and it was a
trademark of the Western world to restrain themselves where these weapons were concerned.
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Truman, like Oppenheimer, had come to see that especially nuclear weapons represented a world
problem due to their massively destructive nature and their inability to be precisely targeted
based on the outcomes of World War II.17 Additionally, Truman was advised that use in North
Korea would not be well received by U.S. allies. As the Director of the Office of Chinese
Affairs put it, opposition to further use of nuclear arms against “defenseless Asiatics” would
weaken the UN front and should be avoided.18 For these reasons, he resisted the urgings of his
advisors to legitimize the weapons through continued use, instead opting to push for further
disarmament and arms control policies via the Atomic Energy Commission.
Obviously, there was a policy of limited nuclear weapon use considered during the
Truman administration. The amount of time spent discussing nuclear armaments shows that the
consideration to use them was high, especially where MacArthur was concerned. Nuclear
weapons were mobilized to the Far East in 1951 and contingency plans were established multiple
times in the instance that the Chinese or Soviets became heavily involved in the war.19 Thus,
this generally confirms the consideration for the policy of nuclear weapon use during the Truman
administration.
Throughout Truman’s policy evolution, two goals are consistent – limiting the spread of
war and limiting the involvement of China and the Soviet Union. None of the NSC documents
or memoranda expresses a need to save an ally or win a war. Instead, the first order goal and
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subject of nearly every NSC document reviewed is limiting the spread of communism and not
turning the Korean War into another world war. This is especially apparent in the 1950 and 1951
documents, where there are ample references to plans for evacuation of troops and limitations on
force use so that the Soviet Union would remain passive.20 Even when the Manchurian border
contingency plans were created, Truman and his advisors discussed whether use of the bomb so
close to the Soviets would provoke them into joining the war.21 Thus, it appears the long-run
goals as Truman perceived them were to limit the spread of communism and to keep the Soviets
out of the war in Korea. Based on these perceived goals, it was apparent to Truman and his
advisors except for MacArthur that nuclear weapons were unnecessary to achieving the desired
goals. This is in keeping with the logic of proportional wartime actions as espoused by the Just
War convention. Barring extreme involvement by the Chinese or direct involvement of the
Soviets, basic conventional weapons were calculated to be the only needed tools of the Korean
War. However, as noted previously, the direct involvement of the Soviets would likely have
altered this calculation, hence the need for plans of last resort which included the use of nuclear
arms.
Overall, it appears that Truman’s nuclear options were restrained by two factors:
international opinion on the bomb and great power politics. Both types of rhetoric show up
within the policy creation process. For instance, the first NSC document presented to Truman,
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NSC 76/1, states that “the determination whether major Soviet combat units have entered Korean
hostilities or have clearly indicated their intention of engaging” must be a primary consideration
in the expansion of force use.22 However, it also states that before initiating a full-scale
mobilization of any forces including nuclear armaments, Truman should consider “appropriate
action in the United Nations” and “the effect on our relations with our principal allies.”23 This
dual rhetoric shows up in other security documents and conversations when full-scale
mobilization and nuclear arms are being considered. Also, one cannot forget when Truman
misspoke in 1950 by expressing the possibility that nuclear weapons were under consideration;
the world’s leaders came to him to discuss the inappropriateness of the option. This forced
Truman to retract his statement and clarify that nuclear arms were only a consideration and
would not be taken without great thought or necessity. While Truman did not directly state his
own moral position where nuclear arms were concerned, the fact that he was so acutely attuned
to the world community’s opinions and sought to coincide with them is telling. To some extent,
it appears that he agreed with the need to limit situations during which nuclear arms could or
should be used, especially contra his own military advisors like MacArthur.
Due to these findings, it appears that the Just War norms of proportionality and last resort
were at work within the Truman administration’s considerations of nuclear arms. However,
concerns of great power politics and deterrence do make appearances within the various policy
debates. For this reason, it appears that the Just War norms, in conjunction with some deterrence
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and utility logical input, restrained the use of full-scale military power and the outbreak of major
power war.

The Eisenhower Administration on Nuclear Arms

Despite difficulties for the Joint Forces during late 1951, Eisenhower’s administration
immediately maintained Truman’s nuclear policy in Korea. But this did not mean that non-use
was the only option; Eisenhower wanted to maintain the policy of limited use in retaliation only
while playing a version of nuclear weapons “chess” in the Far East.24 This chess game involved
positioning weapons or delivery devices in ways that would deter the Soviets from entering the
war, since the Soviets were enhancing their nuclear stockpile. The U.S., at the same time, was
developing smaller tactical nuclear delivery systems to make the weapon more practical. The
Soviets had only achieved a limited number of hydrogen bombs comparable to those dropped on
Nagasaki by all reliable accounts, so the U.S. sought to create atom bombs that operated on a
smaller yield and were more easily targeted using mainstream missiles. Doing this would allow
for more potency and available targets with less collateral damage to Joint Forces. Because of
this search for better weaponry and willingness to play nuclear chess, policies of using the bomb
were discussed more explicitly and the normative restraints on use were fully recognized.
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Over the course of 1952 and 1953, the Eisenhower found that he had inherited a
quagmire of a war with no real end in sight. Spring of 1952 saw the Chinese force’s second
Spring Offensive in which they hurled 250,000 reinforcement troops at various targets. The U.S.
could hold off these forces successfully, but once they pushed the Chinese and North Koreans
beyond the 38th Parallel and to the Hwach’on Reservoir Ridge (also known as the Punchbowl),
the Joint Forces found themselves reaching a standstill. What followed was months of each side
trying to bleed the other dry with no major movement from this demarcation while the politicians
attempted to negotiate an end to the war. But each attempt broke down for the entirety of 1952
and several times over the course of 1953.
As such, this continued inability to achieve a decisive victory resulted in the policy of
using nuclear weapons given certain exigent circumstances came up in at least seven different
NSC documents in 1953, just after Eisenhower took office. Each of them delineates two paths
the United States could take. Either the United States could “maintain the current restrictions on
military operations” or it could “remove these restrictions.”25 The restrictions in question are
consistently defined as those which the Truman administration pursued – the course of limited
war to keep the Soviets from becoming involved. If the latter course were pursued, the
documents consistently detail large-scale, coordinated nuclear offensives in Korea and
Manchuria to win decisively.26
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This “policy of boldness” was favored by Eisenhower’s advisors, especially Curtis
LeMay and John Foster Dulles.27 While both advisors favored nuclear use, they approached it
from different perspectives. LeMay sought to utilize expanded nuclear strikes not only on Korea
but in Manchuria and even against the Soviets pre-emptively. On the hand, Dulles was
astounded by these suggestions and sought to provoke more limited tactical nuclear use in
strategic locations throughout the Korean Peninsula. However, during discussions amongst the
members of the administration, it became apparent that there were factors restraining them from
utilizing nuclear arms in Korea. During one such discussion, Eisenhower was asked if he
intended to use nuclear arms. His response was that we would need to “convince our friends as
to the desirability” of using the bomb, but that the Joint Chiefs should only count on their use in
an instance of major war.28 So long as the Korean War did not involve the Soviets, he did not
plan on using nuclear arms.
It was now that Dulles made his view known that using nuclear arms was a “taboo” and
by relying on allies’ perceptions, Eisenhower would “invite refusals or further limitations on the
use of these weapons.”29 This taboo was based on the experiences of the World Wars, especially
the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While Dulles advised a course of limited use, he
noted that unconventional weapons were significantly different from conventional arms like
bullets and explosives. The degree of discrimination was not in keeping with international
norms and would not be accepted by the world community. Moreover, use of even nonlethal
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unconventional weapons may breach the rules of war, in Dulles’ opinion. Such attacks would
not be tolerated again and may in fact drive allies away from the Joint Command mission in
Korea.30 This voice of limitations on use was echoed in a JCS memo which noted that the
experiences of World War II had tainted considerations of nuclear use, especially for a second
time in the Asian theatre of war. Echoing this commitment to discrimination and non-use, the
Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy advised Eisenhower that, “The goal of our
people has been and ever will be a just and lasting peace for all men of good will.”31 But this
does not mean no consideration should occur. In a memo in 1953, the JCS states that
“employing atomic weapons… against targets in China, Manchuria and Korea” to achieve
military goals.32 However, for this consideration to occur, it would require approval from the
world community and exigent circumstances due to the extreme nature of the weapons in
question.33 This balancing act of necessity versus appropriateness became a consistent thread of
discussion amongst the members of the administration and Eisenhower.
While Eisenhower and his advisors debated the acceptability and requirements for using
nuclear arms in Korea, the Panmunjom peace slowly took place. Eisenhower, in conjunction
with his Joint Chiefs of Staff, prepared a contingency plan in case the talks should break down
and the war should escalate. The contingency plan approved by the NCS in May of 1953 called
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for a major attack on China and included nuclear strikes on strategic locations. These strikes
were meant to force the Chinese and North Koreans to back down simply by their speed and
destruction.34 However, these plans would never have to be used as the Panmunjom Armistice
was signed only weeks later with the Chinese and North Koreans accepting terms to reinstate the
38th Parallel as the boundary between North and South Korea once more.
It is apparent that a policy of nuclear use was seriously considered by Eisenhower. In
one year, there were more references to nuclear weapons use in Korea than there were during
Truman’s entire second term as president. Not only that, but the posturing and consistent
mentions of nuclear strikes during full-scale mobilizations and contingency plans shows that
Eisenhower and his advisors, especially Dulles, were considering the bomb as a legitimate policy
to end the long and costly war. But of importance is the fact that these nuclear considerations
were not a first-use consideration but a retaliatory or defensive posturing due to the opinions of
allies and the need for exigent circumstances or imminent loss conditions to be present.35 Each
plan required that the Soviets become involved in direct and impactful way before any full-scale
mobilization could occur. This is another instance of proportionality and last resort
consideration at work, albeit with a more seriously considered last resort policy than under
Truman.
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Part of that shift in seriousness is a result of the change in goals during the Eisenhower
presidency appear to have altered from those of Truman. The rhetoric of great power politics
and the fear of escalation occur less often within Eisenhower’s NCS meetings and memoranda.
Instead of stemming the spread of communism and the expansion of the Soviet Union, there is
talk of ending of the war and re-unifying the Korean Peninsula.36 This is the rhetoric of victory,
of means-ends calculations which could invited consideration of a range of unconventional
weapons in addition to the conventional arms already being employed. All the options are on the
table and nuclear weapons were “simply another weapon in the arsenal” for Eisenhower.37 This
change in rhetoric appears to reflect the effect that mounting casualties and costs without a clear
end to the war in sight have on the decision-makers.
However, even with the shift in goals and the seriousness of use considerations, restraint
occurs. Thus, if a norm were at work here, it would be contrary to the state interests as perceived
by Eisenhower and his advisors. Norms of proportionality and last resort appear to help restrain
or limit the possibility of use by setting extreme parameters for use which are still in agreement
with the world community’s perspective on nuclear arms as unconventional and illegitimate,
despite the Eisenhower administration’s contrary perspectives. The conversations between
Eisenhower and Dulles show that they recognized world community’s shared view on the use of
nuclear arms and intended to abide by those rules unless an exigent circumstance came to pass.
Given that nuclear use was a last resort, if the U.S. used nuclear armaments before the Soviets
became involved, such an action would be viewed as illegitimate and there would be
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ramifications from allied states. Both Eisenhower and Dulles knew this and could not get past it
to legitimize the non-retaliatory use of nuclear arms. Hence, Eisenhower’s reluctance to use
them until he could get the rest of the world to view them as legitimate. Thus, despite logics of
utility pushing Eisenhower and his administration toward use, Just War norms of proportionality
and last resort restrictions continued to limit their actions where nuclear weapons were
concerned.
Admittedly, however, it appears that limit was fast approaching. If the Korean War
continued much longer and the Panmunjom talks failed, norms may not have prevented the
enacting of the JCS contingency plans to bomb Chinese and North Korean strategic targets.
Utility concerns may have overtaken the normative restraints with a little more time and pressure
to win the war. This consideration is especially true given Eisenhower’s statement in his
Memiors that had the Panmunjom talks have failed and the war continued, “it was clear that [he]
would have to use atomic weapons” to limit the costs of war.38 Also of note here was the Joint
Chiefs re-evaluation of policy toward Korea whereby they argued that should the war continue
into 1954, the U.S. should “employ atomic weapons… against targets in China, Manchuria, and
Korea” in order to achieve military goals and destroy enemy encampments.39
The Korean War was the first military engagement following the use of nuclear
armaments during World War II. An estimated 150,000 deaths occurred in Hiroshima and
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another 75,000 died in Nagasaki because of the bomb. 40 Having witnessed the destructive
events of using the hydrogen bomb, both Truman and Eisenhower knew how devastating the
weapon was. That knowledge did not stop either president from considering using nuclear
weapons in Korea, though it appears to have limited their considerations for use to exigent
circumstances or the instance of imminent defeat.
Overall, it appears that there may have been a developing norm on nuclear non-use
during the entirety of the Korean War, especially during the Eisenhower presidency. The
application of Just War norms restraining policy options on nuclear use despite state interests are
born out in the evidence, especially during the latter part of the war under Eisenhower. This is
unlike the weak correlation during the Truman administration, where the norm was
overshadowed by concerns of escalation and Soviet involvement. However, this oscillation is to
be expected given the relative newness of the application of Just War norms to nuclear arms.
While both Truman and Eisenhower considered a policy of nuclear weapons use, neither used
these tools of warfare even if it would have helped during the war. It must be noted though that
if the war had continued much longer, then the restraining effect of the norm on U.S. policy may
not have lasted; the mentality may have shifted back to a realist mindset of victory and
consequences logics.
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Bug Bombs over Korea

While the U.S. appears to have actively prepared for the possible use of nuclear arms but
stayed their hand due to international pressure and concerns of appropriateness, there was
another ongoing story at the time: claims that the U.S. had used biological and chemical weapons
against the Chinese and North Korean forces opposed to them. Allegations arose in 1951, as the
U.S. pushed toward the Yalu River and Chinese forces became involved, then again several
times at pivotal points in the war during 1952. But what legitimacy did these claims hold? That
very question has been under scrutiny since the claims were pushed by the Chinese and Soviets
beginning in 1951.
The first charge of biological weapons use came on May 8, 1951 as the Chinese forces
began the First Spring Offensive, their largest push into the Korean mainland and also the largest
series of battles in the entirety of the war.41 Having just lost to the U.S. and U.N. allied forces at
the Battles of Imjin River and Kapyong, as well as the success of the U.S. Navy Task Force 77 in
having flooded the Han and Pukhan River valleys, the Spring Offensive was not going well for
the Chinese forces.42 Facing heavy losses, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of North Korea sent
accusations to the UN Security Council charging the U.S. with bacteriological weapons use
during the period of December 1950 to January 1951. At that particular time, the U.S. and allied
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forces had been pushed south from the Yalu River back to Seoul but in the process had sustained
immense losses during the running of the Kunu-ri Gauntlet.43 It was claimed by the North
Koreans and Chinese that the U.S. had purposefully spread smallpox using aerosol dispersal
mechanisms in order to cover their retreat and slow their attackers.
However, the U.N. Security Council largely dismissed until further complaints arose in
1952. It was on February 22, 1952 that Bak Hun Yung, North Korea’s Foreign Minister, sent
word again to the U.N. about U.S. use of biological weapons. This time, the claims were more
detailed. The U.S. was accused of air drops to pelt their enemy with “bug bombs,” glass
canisters filled with insects bearing bacteriological infections such as the plague. There were
also claims of spreading cholera via infected clams placed into the fishing zones of the North
Koreans. These attacks were to have taken place throughout North Korea on during January and
February of 1952 and the Foreign Minister of China, Zhou Enlai, backed up these claims with
similar accounts from Chinese forces. Enlai went further though, accusing the U.S. of sending
448 aircraft on approximately 60 missions during from February to March into Chinese territory
to airdrop these bug bombs, as well as various plant diseases.44
To provide evidence to the claims, the Chinese and North Korean governments used two
international commissions of their devising to collect evidence and provide first-hand accounts
of the U.S. actions. These two commissions, one led by the International Association of
Democratic Lawyers and the other by the Chinese government itself via the World Peace
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Council, provide two reports stating that the U.S. had used unconventional weapons against
combatants and civilians alike.45 Charges of breaking the Geneva Conventions Protocols
banning the use of biological agents were leveled within these reports. In the latter
commission’s report, entitled the “International Scientific Commission for the Investigation of
the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China,” the lead scientist Dr. Joseph
Needham detailed that fewer incidents and vectors than the Chinese claimed were used were
actually found upon investigation of the supposed attack sites but that attacks did occur.46
However, the evidence utilized by Dr. Needham’s commission was supplied by the Chinese
investigators; no independent research was performed or samples collected. The international
community was skeptical at best that the supposed attacks had taken place, instead proposing
that contact with a plague-stricken set of troops from Manchuria in addition to a lack inoculation
resulted in widespread illnesses within the Chinese and North Korean ranks.47
Throughout this process of accusations and denials, the U.S. remained resolute in that
no biological or chemical arms were being utilized against Chinese or North Korean forces. In
1952, the U.S. denied these allegations three times. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that
the claims of the Chinese and North Koreans were “categorically and unequivocably false.”48
General Ridgeway reiterated this twice, once before Congress during hearings on the prosecution
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of the war and if there was any validity to the accusations. He stated before Congress that “no
element of the United Nations Command has employed either germ or gas warfare in any form at
any time.”49 These statements were repeated before the UN General Assembly when the Soviet
representative Malik introduced charges against the allied forces and the U.S. on behalf of the
Chinese and North Koreans. Here, both the U.S. representative Benjamin Cohen and the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley submitted denials of the claims.50
But beyond simple denials, the U.S. decision-makers had made their policy concerning
biological and chemical warfare abundantly clear before the start of the Korean War. Looking at
NSC 62, which was approved in 1950, one can see exactly the U.S. position concerning the use
of this type of unconventional weapons. Therein, it was stated that the U.S. position on both all
unconventional weapons was that “chemical, biological and radiological weapons will not be
used by the United States except in retaliation.”51 The position was affirmed in NSC 147 where
it referred to the restrictions placed upon all U.N. operations within the Korean peninsula.
Throughout the war, this position was held by U.S. decision-makers. In March 1951, the
distinction and comparison of biological, chemical and radiological weapons is even made as
compared to “conventional weapons” of warfare; the Department of State advisory council
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argued that Acheson should move for these “unconventional weapons” to be outlawed because
their illegitimacy within the world purview.52
Now, this is not to say that the U.S. had not considered use of biological and chemical
weapons. Examination of documents from 1952 to 1953 shows that the U.S. had planned for the
possible use of these weapons under extreme circumstances. Executive Secretary Lay writes that
given the cost and casualties of the Korean War at the end of 1952, should the war continue then
the limits placed on tactics may be lifted. He holds that the U.S. should maintain its “no first
strike” restriction in keeping with NSC 62 and 147 unless we face “military disaster.”53 His only
major caveat to this plan was to distinguish between “critical targets” and “refugees” or “civilian
groups,” as the latter would not be permissible. Otherwise, there were several strategic targets
for all forms of unconventional weapons within the U.S. arsenal.54 That said, there was no
apparent mobilization or reiteration from any other staff member, nor from Truman or
Eisenhower of the possibility of chemical or biological weapons use throughout the Korean War.
After the accusations and denials of 1952, the UN finally interceded and requested the
help of the International Committee of the Red Cross or the World Health Organization in
determining the legitimacy of the two side’s claims. The ICRC requested access to the supposed
attack sites throughout the spring of 1952 but was met by silence. Taking issue with this lack of
legitimate outcomes, the U.S. sought for the Security Council to mete out a resolution requiring
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access to the sites, which was met twice with Soviet vetoes. One final attempt was made by the
U.S. in April 1953 to find resolution to the matter and validate its claims of non-use, which was
also vetoed. However, just days before this, the USSR withdrew its complaint about
bacteriological weapons use and the matter was dropped. The U.N. General Assembly decision
on the matter simply stated that the commission was unable to determine any use claims due to a
lack of assistance from the Chinese and North Korean sides.55
There is still some debate on the possibility of biological weapons during the Korean
War. On the one hand, the generally accepted story which is backed by Soviet documents now
available to researchers is that the claims presented before the U.N. were propaganda techniques
of the Soviets.56 On the other hand, there are those who believe that the U.S. could use
biological weapons and get away with it without retribution from the world community.57 All
available evidence though seems to support the former conclusion rather than the latter.

Conclusions from Korea

The Korean War became the first proving ground for the norms against unconventional
weapon use. Radiological, biological and chemical weapons were prominently discussed with
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repeatedly regularity during throughout the war. And the conditions were seemingly right for
them to be used. The U.S. was facing a highly resistance pair of adversaries who had an ally in
the USSR which had limited nuclear capacities. Strategic targets existed for all weapons types
and several times the U.S. and U.N. forces came within a hair’s breadth of being pushed off the
peninsula altogether. It was obviously important to Far East interests that the U.S. and U.N.
achieve victory, so much so that 1.7 million U.S. troops alone were thrown into the “meat
grinder” to win. But no victory was achieved and massive casualties were sustained, as well as
financial and military costs. So why? Why restrain one’s options to the simply “conventional”
given the extreme circumstances?
The answer to this question takes a couple different forms. First, Truman and
Eisenhower, as well as General MacArthur and Executive Secretary Lay, were not above the
consideration of using radiological, biological or chemical weapons. Serious plans were made
for all weapons types and targets were drawn up; moreover, stockpiles and necessary delivery
devices were mobilized to the region. Opportunities presented themselves during the push back
to the Yalu River, while retreating to Seoul, during the battle of Inchon and while attempting to
defend Seoul numerous times. Nuclear arms were even mobilized to the region with B52s being
prepared on the northern tip of Japan for the eventuality that use could become reality. Despite
these windows of opportunity and even of mounting necessity, the unconventional weapons
never rained down on the heads of the Chinese nor North Korean forces.
Instead, both at the outset of the war and during these critical junctures where loss was
imminent, the key decision-makers turned from Realist concerns of power and survival toward
concerns of appropriateness given the circumstances of war at that moment. These two points of
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view faced constant juxtaposition during debates about wartime policy through the Korean
conflict but always came back to the idea of appropriateness as key. Oppenheimer puts it best
during a discussion with the National Security Council in 1950 when he describes the problem of
unconventional arms, especially the A-bomb, as being a sharp contrast between morals and
military strategy. As he put it,
Two things stand out sharply with reference to the A-bomb: one is terror and the other is
mystery… There is a difference between killing ten people and ten million [that is] more
than a difference of degrees… [it is] a matter of morality.58

This is not to say that norms were the only factor of importance. Of note is that the U.S.
was highly concerned with Soviet and Chinese involvement in the war. Given the limited goals
through most of the Korean War, it was necessary to limit U.S. weaponry being utilized in order
decrease the chances of direct conflict with the Chinese and Soviets. This was especially true
where unconventional weapons were concerned. If the Chinese and Soviets became involved,
U.S. and U.N. decision-makers knew that the potential for a protracted war ending in a stalemate
or even loss was dramatically increased. Also, decision-makers knew of the rapid Soviet
developments of radiological arms. While their weapons were not as advanced as the U.S.
nuclear armory, it was still formidable and increasing in sheer numbers quickly. These very
Realist concerns are not to be discounted in analyzing the interactions occurring within this case,
but they appear to play more into goals develop versus necessary means for attaining such goals
than as a deterrence mechanism.
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That said, these utility and deterrence factors were the same concerns and arguments
which prompted the discussion of unconventional weapon use during the case and even
motivated the need for planning and preparation should the conflict drag out or North Korea’s
allies become involved. As such, it can be argued that it was the normative concerns about the
weapons themselves which resulted in true restraint. Rational consideration of the impact of
unconventional weapons and a concern for the approval of the U.S.’s allies around the world
gave rise to restraint where it otherwise would not have been. Consistently, Truman and
Eisenhower sought to take the world community’s pulse on unconventional weapon use in a nonretaliatory manner. Each time they did so, the response was consistent with the moral
adjudications that resulted from the World Wars.
Moreover, there were prudential concerns which are cohesive with the logics of Just War
involved in the U.S. fear of Soviet nuclear escalation or retaliation. Remember that Just War
norms set parameters for use of unconventional weapons which include absolute necessity
proportional to the desired outcome given the opponent’s capabilities. Here, we see U.S.
decision-makers examining first the military prowess of the North Koreans alone and
determining that nothing more than conventional weapons was necessary for victory. Once
China becomes involved, the calculations of proportionality alter given the increased threat
posed to victory chances but do not exceed the standard of exigency which would permit
unconventional weapon use. Rationally, unconventional weapons become more viable but are
still not necessary for winning. This is in spite of the fact that strategic military targets which
would have satisfied the logic of utility and the norm of discrimination were available for U.S.
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bombing runs. Still, unconventional weapons were restrained because a state of supreme
emergency had not arisen.
The final parameter then for the U.S. to have used unconventional arms would have been
Soviet involvement and the direct threat of failure to protect vital interests in East Asia. At that
point, and that point only, it was determined that only then would unconventional weapons
become necessary for victory. Had the Soviets become directly involved, one could extrapolate
that a further limit of the imminent and real threat of Soviet unconventional weapon use would
have been drawn, meaning one more limit would have been put in place before unconventional
pre-emption or retaliation could occur. It is here where the extreme use policies of MacArthur
and LeMay would have collided with the limited use options of Dulles. But based on the
discussions surrounding those options, it appears limited use of unconventional weapons against
strategic targets would have been the preferred policy of the two administrations. Luckily, the
milestone of direct Soviet involvement was never reached to fully test the Just War logics of
proportionality and last resort.
Thus, restraint here is a mixture of Realist power concerns with a boundary of moral,
normative, Just War rhetorical devices. The latter is what ultimately stayed the U.S. hand from
using unconventional weapons in Korea; if the former had had a stronger impact, then it is highly
likely that the U.S. would have utilized unconventional weapons as MacArthur, LeMay, and
Dulles advised considering they would have resulted in expedited victory. Now the question
becomes this: would these arguments for restraint have held for much longer? U.S. rhetoric
shows that decision-making relied on drawing lines of last resort and consideration of
proportional between goals and necessary means, given consideration for world community
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beliefs associated with such means. Thus, if the U.S. was willing to draw up plans for use and
even consider use after a five-year conflict, what happens when the conflict scope is increased in
terms of time, cost, and enemies faced which make the chances of victory more questionable?
That remains a point of contention and leaves open the door to exigencies permitting future use
of unconventional weapons by the U.S.

CHAPTER 6
LOOKING BACK AND MOVING AHEAD

So why do major powers avoid using unconventional weapons for the better part of the
20th Century? Why does the United States or Russia not utilize nuclear arms when it is in their
benefit to do so? Why does Japan not seek to expand its knowledge of biological weapons
through further experience? Why does Germany not continue developing its chemical armory to
perfect the mustard gas it introduced to the world? In short, as John Gaddis puts it,
…[A]ssume counterfactually that… Country X had gained exclusive control over
what seemed, as first glance, to be an ‘absolute’ weapon… [W]ould one not regard X
as very likely, if it should ever get into another military conflict at whatever level, to
use its new instrument of warfare to ensure victory as long as there was no realistic
prospect of retaliation by Y or anyone else? Abstraction suggests that [this] should
have happened during the period in which the United States enjoyed an effective
nuclear monopoly. The fact that in reality [it did not] requires explanation.1
What explanations exist for this phenomenon of non-use for these highly destructive
weapons of war despite incentives to use?
Several logics within international relations have claimed to explain this
phenomenon. For structural realists, the logics of utility and deterrence that account for
costs and benefits of actions given a systemic power distribution have traditionally been
the dominant explanation. More recently, social constructivists have proposed that a
series of absolute prohibitionary norms govern unconventional weapon restraint. These
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logics each have problems, however, and do not reflect the archival data nor the sharp
oscillations and narrow misses in the history of unconventional weapon policy. Instead, I
have proposed that a tradition of non-use grounded in Just War norms is the appropriate
operable logic for understanding these shifts and narrow misses. The norms of
discrimination, proportionality and supreme emergency were proposed as an alternative
means of assessing policy creation toward unconventional weapons as a class of
illegitimate tools of war. In short, the targets, goals versus available means, weapon’s
effects and level of threat matter to decision-makers when considering unconventional
weapons.
To test these logics against one another, a series of case studies were performed to
determine which, if any, of the logics was visible in the decision-making processes. The
cases examined both CBW and nuclear decision-making in the United States from World
War I through the Korean War. Thus, several conclusions can be drawn from the
findings of each case.
1. The traditional international relations explanations based on power and risk have
limited explanatory power over the actual decision-making and policies. While
most would assume that power distribution and risk analysis would cover all
cases, it fails to explain why major powers were more likely to use
unconventional arms against other major powers and not against a minor power
like North Korea. This is especially damaging to the logic of utility, which would
argue along the lines of LeMay and MacArthur that nuclear weapons could and
should have been employed to bring about immediate victory instead of a drawn
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out and costly war. Moreover, the lack of mutually assured destruction in the
Korea War case calls into question logics from deterrence. For these reasons,
structural realist logics of utility and deterrence appear to fail to explain all
instances of unconventional weapon use and non-use.

2. The logic of separate taboos cannot explain the sharp oscillations in policy and
serious considerations of use, nor the similar argumentation for nuclear and
CBW non-use after the World Wars. While major powers appear to abide by the
“taboo” of non-use for each individual weapon type, they come close to breaking
or do break those rules in certain scenarios. In World War I and II, both nuclear
and CBW weapons faced sharp criticisms and questions of legality and morality
from their incarnation. Yet, in both instances, a lack of experience and arguments
of supreme emergency resulted in their use and immediate revocation based on
the effects of the weapons. In Korea, nuclear weapons are highly considered and
even mobilized with the condition that Soviet interference would threaten to
destabilize the Far East and could bring the U.S. directly under nuclear threat.
Had these weapons been subject to a taboo, this degree of consideration should
never have occurred. Moreover, questions concerning Agent Orange use and
nuclear mobilization during Vietnam raise eyebrows because the taboos should
have been sufficiently internalized by this point in history. Thus, it appears that
the logic of absolute prohibitionary norms or taboos fails to explain some of the
sharper oscillations, rule-breaking and narrow misses.
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3. The Just War tradition’s jus en bello norms of proportionality and discrimination
provide a more dynamic and accurate account of the oscillations in policy toward
unconventional weapons as whole. The cases investigated exhibit how the ideas
of proportionality and discrimination have impacted decisions about nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons. In World War I and II, the lack experience
with the weapons in question or knowledge of how they might adversely affect
the tide of war was clearly shown. However, due to the degree of threat faced and
the imminence of that threat, it was determined that these weapons which had
already faced some level of moral concern could be used. Having U.S. soldiers
gassed in World War I with the imminent threat of Western Europe falling or
being directly attacked in Pearl Harbor and facing a costly invasion of the
Japanese mainland in World War II, the U.S. determined in both wars that the
criteria for supreme emergency was met. This opened the door to CBW use in
World War I and nuclear use in World War II. However, after the fact as further
information was acquired about the effects of these weapons, the U.S.
spearheaded the immediate suspension of use for these unconventional weapons.
The argument was the same for each weapon – they caused undo harm, suffering
and threatened the stability of the world if their use continued or was normalized.
Both weapon types faced the same moral and legitimacy concerns from a subset
of the U.S. decision-making base, either soldiers on the ground in World War I or
scientists and some military advisors in World War II. But circumstances were
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such that the typical degree of restraint could be waived, permitting the U.S. to
use CBWs and nuclear arms despite these concerns. Moreover, in the case of the
Korean War, tests of proportionality showed that while considerations and
mobilization of unconventional arms were serious, the U.S. had drawn a line that
use would only occur if the Soviets became a direct threat. Additionally, it was
determined that only military targets would be chosen for limited nuclear strikes,
instead of whole cities as was the case in World War II. Recognition of the lack
of legitimacy for these weapons resulting from ex post facto considerations during
the World Wars played heavily on the minds of Truman and Eisenhower, making
them unwilling to attempt to legitimize or normalize the weapons as their advisors
suggested.

4. The tradition of unconventional weapon non-use should not be viewed as a
permanent ban, as the conditions of supreme emergency suggest. Proportionality
and the war conventional dictate that under normal war circumstances and in the
pursuit of typical wartime goals, conventional weapons and tactics should be
enough to achieve the desired ends. But not all wars fit this mold. Walzer,
Fotion, Paul and others are right to assume that this prohibition on unconventional
weapons is not permanent. The narrow misses and conditions for limited use
expressed in the World War I and Korean War cases show that it may be possible
for these weapons to become legitimate given specific circumstances. If the
threat is existential or potentially systemically destabilizing and it is imminent,
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then states may be able to argue that need for unconventional weapons use. In
these cases, unconventional weapon use should still be limited in nature and as
discriminatory as possible to avoid adversely impacting the chances for returning
to the status quo of peace. However, this part of the theory remains to be tested
thoroughly. Here I must admit that it is my hope that I never have to test this
portion of the theory and that the tradition of unconventional weapon non-use will
continue, but the future is difficult to predict and so I must restrain myself from
saying too much more on this finding.
Despite the fact that this project has shown that major powers like the U.S. have
acknowledged and even abided by Just War norms as they are applied to unconventional weapon
of a radiological, chemical and biological nature, that is not the end of the story. War is a
dynamic structure. New situations and new technology are always developing, thereby changing
the calculations associated with unconventional weapons. Future extensions of this project will
need to examine U.S. decision-making in Vietnam, the First Persian Gulf War, and the current
War on Terrorism in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, as well as the development of intervening
treaties prohibiting unconventional use along the way. This will be the focus of my research for
the near future but it does not come without some difficulties. There are challenges to this
research that will require further investigation to determine how the norms of the war convention
influences other decisions and decision-makers over the 20th and into the 21st Century of warfare.
These challenges include but are not limited to: the impact Just War norms have on minor
powers, belligerent states and non-states; the continued impact they have as the technology of
warfare develops; and how these Just War norms on weapons apply to emerging weapons
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technologies. Let me take each of these turn and elaborate briefly on the individual challenges
they pose to this project, as well as how they could be pursued in future investigations.

Universality of Just War Norms

The claims presented here have specifically been limited to how Just War has affected
major powers like the U.S., Britain, France and China. But one could easily claim that to create
that limit is to do an injustice to the Just War tradition and even to the theoretical story told in
Chapter 2 whereby rules of war develop and are applied. According to that story, once an
experience with a weapon of mass destruction is been had by the world community, the jus en
bellum norms of the Just War tradition are utilized in order to judge the appropriateness and even
morality of the associated weapon. Instances like World War I and II become catalysts then for
future generations to remember the exact levels of death and destruction that come from the use
of unconventional weapons of a radiological, biological or chemical variety. As such, the lesson
and subsequent application of the norms becomes a universal one whereby all men with a degree
of prudential reason should then learn and follow the rules as agreed upon.
That said, we can easily look at history, including that of the U.S., and see where this
story could fall apart: in the claim of universality. When one makes an argument from the
position of actor rationality, it is assumed that human experience and the creation of guiding
principles takes on a similar pattern the world over and throughout time; that is the heart of
universality made within the Just War tradition resulting in applied norms such as those against
unconventional weapon use. However, if that process of rule creation is universal, then how
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does deviations from the norms prohibiting the use of radiological, biological and chemical
weapons be explained? The use of Agent Orange during Vietnam by the U.S., of mustard gas by
Iraq before the 1st Persian Gulf War, of biological agents by Britain and Japan both before and
during World War II all provide challenges to the claim of universality. Beyond that, the
consistent testing of nuclear devices by the Soviets throughout the Cold War and now by North
Korea create a potential problem. And currently, the use of various chemical gases by non-state
groups such as IS and Aum Shinrikyo since 1990 force one to beg the question of the validity of
these findings from a purely U.S. standpoint. Are the Just War norms proposed as governing
unconventional weapons merely the rules of the strong or of the democratic? I would contend
that that is not the case; even minor powers or belligerent states as well as non-state entities are
abiding by logics of Just War prudential reasoning but not in the same way as a major power.
Recall that the Just War en bellum norms are threefold: (1) proportionality of attack to
goal; (2) targeting of combatants and avoidance of harm to non-combatants; and (3) the doctrine
of double-intent whereby one aims for good and avoids taking pleasure in harming others. The
process then takes on a stage whereby differing experiences or degrees of experience help actors
in applying the Just War norms to specific circumstances of warfare. This process, while
typically following a similar pattern and resulting in non-use of unconventional weapons, has
some room for variation in outcomes but is always couched in the rhetoric of Just War. When an
actor is utilizing their prudential reasoning to determine if use of any unconventional weapon is
legitimate, they refer back to the Just War tradition’s three norms. If the weapon is
misunderstood or has limited available knowledge about the effects, it may be possible use to
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occur and then be deemed illegitimate after the fact, as appears to be the case where Agent
Orange is concerned.
Alternatively, if the actor is the weaker side within an asymmetric war or that the end
result of the war is going to be highly unfavorable (or even catastrophic) for them, then Just War
norms and the circumstances of that particular war open up a window of opportunity during
which unconventional weapons may be justifiable. This type of threat would fulfill the criteria to
count as a supreme emergency or existential threat. Nicholas Fotion suggests this possibility in
his discussion that there may be a second type of Just War theory applicable to nontraditional or
asymmetric wars.2 It could be argued that belligerent powers, such as Germany and Japan
during the World War II era, utilized this logic to determine that use of chemical and biological
weapons was legitimate because of the sheer force of the Allied opponents which they faced.
Their use and development was necessary. The Soviet Union’s testing of larger and more
destructive atomic weapons over the course of the Cold War as well as Norther Korea’s current
nuclear arms development follows a similar logic of prudential survival against a system
perceived as unfair and threatening. Thus, one could argue that rational limits were placed on
how and when these belligerent powers who were fighting an entire system stacked against their
favor would utilize unconventional weapons. But should the harm of non-use outweigh the
benefits, then it appears that belligerent actors are willing to bend or break the rules out of
absolute necessity.
Minor powers and non-state actors appear to utilize slightly different arguments from
belligerent states as to why unconventional weapons use is legitimate in their cases. For minor
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powers, the argument of proportionality is key. Minor powers, when faced with the threat of
much stronger forces or even systemic rules, must utilize any and all weapons in their arsenal to
survive. The case of chemical weapons by Iraq before the 1st Persian Gulf War might be a case
of just this logic. Despite being used against a relatively weaker Kurdish population, it could be
argued that the major powers in charge of the system had built up a situation where Iraq’s
decision-makers felt that the chemical weapons use had become proportional to their overall
wellbeing. And for non-state actors, the argument of proportionality for minor powers becomes
meshed with the argument for distinguishing civilians from soldiers to create a case where use in
civilian centers becomes possibly legitimized. For non-state actors, the distinction between
civilians and soldiers today is constantly blurred because war from their perspective is not about
lining up armies on a battlefield; war for non-state actors is about battling ideas and ways of life
whereby winning means becoming the dominant perspective on the world and losing means
being relegated to page of the history books. From a non-state actor’s perception on war, there is
an extreme power disparity which automatically opens up the legitimacy of unconventional
weapons use. There is also an opening up of targets to include all who follow the “enemy” way
of life as a target because they could easily fight back to maintain dominance of their culture. As
such, not only does prudential reason given the circumstances tell non-state actors that
unconventional weapons are ok to use but that they can target anyone deemed an enemy because
of what is being fought for: cultural survival, not simply state or regime survival.
In each of these instances, the Just War norms of proportionality are being followed, even
if the rule of discrimination is being bent given supreme emergency considerations. What makes
a difference is the circumstances under which these norms are being applied to the weapons in
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question. However, these are simply arguments of conjecture given the narrowed scope of this
particular research project. The questions raised here will be part of future projects in order to
fully determine if these Just War norms prohibiting unconventional weapon use are universal and
if all actors follow them or at least recognize them when deciding to bend or break the systemic
rules.

Refined Unconventional Arms: Miniaturized Nuclear Arms and Targeted Vectors

As stated at the beginning of the first chapter, war breeds innovation. The threat of
conflict and chances of survival require that states develop new technology and weapons. This
development process has not stopped at the creation of bug bombs, phosgene, mustard gas,
atomic bombs or ICBM nuclear delivery devices. The aspects of biological, chemical and
radiological weapons are still under development, both in the U.S. and afar. As such, it may be
possible the classification of these weapons as unused unconventional arms under Just War
norms to change. But for this change to happen, the new technologies would have to be (1)
targeted more precisely, (2) useful in limited engagements, and (3) not require other states to
respond with larger, more destabilizing armaments of an unlimited variety. To that end, there are
two areas of technological development in the chemical, biological and radiological arms that
may result in greater utility and justifiability in future conflicts.
The first of these changes is the miniaturization of nuclear arms. Traditional nuclear
weapons utilizing fusion or fission technology have required some type of missile as a delivery
device. Large megaton yields have required equally large missiles as a delivery device. Current
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arsenals largely feature intercontinental ballistic missiles as this delivery device in order to
ensure that the megaton yield detonates a safe distance away from user. But as has already been
discussed, these types of nuclear arms containing yields of 20 megatons or more have a tendency
to be unprecise and cause mass devastation which requires second use responses from others.
This makes a traditional nuclear warhead on an ICBM relatively unjustifiable. However, these
are not the only yields and delivery devices available to modern nuclear states. Two such low
yield nuclear arms are the W54 “briefcase bomb” and the M28/29 or 388 Davy Crockett models.
The briefcase bomb was a development on the Russian’s part to miniaturize nuclear arms.
Loaded into a normal sized suitcase, the Russians built a 0.5 to 1 megaton model of a nuclear
weapon that could be used in urban warfare by spies. This model has since been adapted by the
U.S. to become the W54 model, which supports up to a 6 megaton yield device capable of being
fit inside of a backpack. Similarly, the U.S. developed the M28/29 Davy Crockett model. Also a
low yield device, the Davy Crockett is a traditional explosive device intended to be launched at
an opponent via a 155mm recoilless rocket launcher. Both of these technological developments
have been in existence since the 1960s but neither have been utilized on the battlefield.3 But if
the weapons were further refined, it is possible that the restraint previously shown toward these
miniature tactical nuclear arms may change.
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As with the developments in precision for nuclear arms, biological and chemical weapons
have seen similar changes in terms of precision and the limitation of unnecessary casualties. The
current advances in biochemistry have yielded one major area of research and development for
CBWs: targeted vectors. Recall that one of the major problems facing those using biological and
chemical arms is the inability to control dispersion of the weapons such that unintended targets
and even allies may be affected by the agents. A change in wind direction or an inability to
control the vector of disease transmission could spell defeat and devastation for the user just as
easily as the intended target. However, targeted vectors could solve this problem. Currently
utilized in gene therapy for viral infections or diseases, targeted vectors have built in chemical or
biological agents which seek out specifically programmed cells. Once the target cell has been
found, the agent then latches on and can impact the host individual, providing cures just as easily
as impediments. This nanotechnology could supply states with the perfect programmable vector
to attack a specific genetic code marker, thereby rendering only enemies able to be targeted
instead of relying on the elements and luck.4
These new developments could result in a change of classification for biological,
chemical, and radiological weapons. By changing the delivery devices, limiting the destructive
potential, and minimizing the chances of escalation, these new technologies could see use in
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future warfare assuming refinement continues. At such a point, a reassessment of the
applicability of Just War parameters for use would be in order.

Emerging Technologies: Robots, Lasers, Sound Cannons and Cyberwarfare

While states have sought to refine the unconventional arms they already hold in their
arsenals, these are not the only technological developments happening which require
consideration. As pointed to in Chapter 1, war drives the innovation of technology. War will not
simply stop; neither will technological development. Thus, a consideration of the applicability
of the Just War tradition norm judging CBWs and nuclear arms to be unconventional may be
applied to other technological developments as well. Four such developments necessitate
thought beyond what is capable here in this project: the development of drones and robots for use
on the battlefield, laser weapons, sound cannons, and the escalation of cyberwarfare. I will settle
for cursory overviews here with the intention to revisit these topics in the future as more
information on their development and use becomes available.
Over the last 15 years, we have seen the development and heavy use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) or drones in wartime. Beginning with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S.
development and use of UAVs has escalated and spread to other countries. The technology acts
as a means of seeking victory without risking life or limb to do so. Wireless technology permits
a user to safely fly the UAV from a distance, utilizing a large variety of ballistic or explosive
ordinances against the target. But such a weapon changes the metrics of decision-making on the
part of both states with UAVs in their arsenals and those who do not have them. Do states who
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have UAVs use them against those without? Is this a proportional means of warfare? On this
point, the opinion of the world seems fairly clear that the use of UAVs is conventional; it acts
similar to any other plane despite being unmanned. Can the targeting systems of the UAVs be
trusted enough to properly guide ordinances to their intended military targets? This is a more
debatable topic. Human error and compounded by technological difficulties can and have
resulted in ordinances missing their targets and hitting civilian population centers. But this
aspect of UAVs has seen several stages of refinement already and will continue to see changes as
the degree of use increases.5 Thus, at this point in time, it appears the UAVs are deemed
conventional arms but that could change, just as it did in retrospect for biological, chemical and
radiological arms.
Relatedly, one must consider the developments in robotics technology being pursued by
multiple states. Mechanized suits of armor provide the wearer with a mobile bulletproof tank of
sorts. Examples of this can be seen in Japan with the development of the Kuratas project and in
the U.S with the XOS-2 exoskeleton and TALOS battle suit.6 The Kuratas is a 13-foot-tall fully
mobile battle armor that comes complete with a variety of weapons options, while the XOS-2
and TALOS suits are smaller, battery operated bulletproof armors intended to increase the
wearer’s strength, speed and durability on a battlefield. None of these armors have seen
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battlefield use and the XOS-2 and TALOS armors are still only in development stages.
However, the Kuratas battle armor is fully tested and developed currently, with non-weaponized
versions being available to the general public for a starting price of $1.8 million dollars. Just as
with UAVs though, one must ask how legitimate such developments in robotics are for the
battlefield. Are they proportional and accurate? It is too soon to tell how public opinion will be
on this new technology but it can be safely assumed that like UAVs, these robotic battle armors
will be classified as conventional until proven otherwise through experience.
Two other such technologies are laser and sound weaponry. These are not simply
armaments for delivering munitions to targets, but are actually munitions in and of themselves.
Laser weapon systems (LaWs), also known as rail guns, are already in development by the U.S.
Navy for use on battleships such as the USS Ponce, as well as by Lockheed Martin for use on F35 Joint Strike Fighters, AC-130 gunships, and the B-1 and B-2 bomber. LaWS utilize high
particle acceleration delivery systems to fire pulses of light at specified long range targets.
Unlike normal guns or cannons, LaWS have infinite ammunition as they simply convert
electrical energy into light pulses. The result is a high heat, high speed impact that melts or even
disintegrates objects hit by the light pulse, though that is simply conjecture based on the effects
of scientific lasers since these weapons have not been fired in live weapons runs.7 The
technology has been in development for some time now, but recent hearings by the Senate
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Technology show that the initial classified tests are
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yielding good results and first open demonstrations are expected by the year 2023.8 Could this
be classified as an unconventional weapon in the future? The answer is absolutely. A weapon
which is technically unable to be defended against, which burns holes through its targets and
causes excruciating pain to those that it does not kill sounds like the very definition of an
unconventional weapon. But judgments on the legitimacy of this technology should wait until
further data becomes available.
Likewise, there is sonic weaponry. Sonic weapons or ultrasonic weapons (uSWs) have
been in existence since World War II. Hitler’s chief architect Albert Speer had been researching
and developing what he called the acoustic cannon, a device which harnessed high resonance
sounds to impact the workings of the inner ear and brain in a way which could kill a man. The
weapon was never fully developed but the idea remained impactful on weapons researchers. The
U.S. performed their own research into uSWs during Vietnam with Project Jericho. The idea
here was not so much to use sound as a lethal weapon but as one to disorient the Viet Kong
snipers. The U.S. also researched how sound might be used in interrogations of POWs, which we
have seen come to fruition during the recent war on terror in places such as Guantanamo Bay.
Again, non-lethal sound waves used in high volumes were a tool to disorient and mentally breakdown detainees.9 But most recently, we have seen this technology weaponized once more in the
form of LRADs, or long range acoustic devices. Nicknamed the Scream, these devices propel
sound in directed areas at 150 decibels toward groups of people. The effect is to highly vibrate
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the eardrum, causing nausea, severe headaches and disorientation.10 LRADs have been used
both domestically in places during the 2009 G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, the 2016 Ferguson riots
and the 2016 North Dakota pipeline face off, as well as internationally by Israel against the
Palestinians and by the U.S. in Afghanistan and Iraq. Could these weapons be classified as
unconventional and illegitimate? In their current state, no. They appear on the surface to have
been limited to non-lethal levels of sound which stuns enemies at a range of 3,500 feet. But it
should be noted that if the decibel level were to increase above 160 or the resistors were changed
to handle higher power levels than 9 mHz, then these weapons could have lasting and lethal
effects.11 As such, any future developments may change their classification from conventional to
unconventional armaments.

Concluding Remarks

When all is said and done, the various theories proposed and test cases examined, the
evidence shows that greater consideration of the Just War tradition’s impacts on wartime
decisions is required. Our history with technology and weapons development is a dynamic one.
War is a dynamic process of goals, fighting and loss that requires constant reassessment.
However, international relations theory has largely relied on static predictive elements to
determine if or when unconventional arms may be used. Structural realism’s logics of utility and
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deterrence can only explain so much but cannot properly explain instances of non-use where
there should have been use. Constructivism’s absolute prohibition norms can explain the
ultimate decision not to use, but cannot explain use scenarios, deviations from the taboos, or the
oscillations in policy. It takes a truly dynamic logic in order to accurately reflect our complex
history with these weapons and their similar trajectories.
The war convention norms of proportionality and discrimination give the necessary
formulas and understandings to make sense of the archival data and decision-maker recollections
in their complete complexity. This is an invaluable tool moving forward in analyzing wartime
decision-making. Why were certain weapons employed against specific targets? How did we
come so close to bombing X target and not Y? Why are conventional arms being refine and
advanced while some unconventional weapons are left in stockpiles that are decades old? Under
what conditions might the tradition of non-use be set aside and these unconventional weapons be
used once more? All of these questions are of great importance today. Given the increased
concern over nuclear North Korea and possibly Iran, Syria’s use of chemical weapons against
intrastate elements, and both the U.S. and Russia seeking to refine and increase their nuclear
arsenals, now is exactly the time for a dynamic and accurate logic associated with the tradition of
unconventional weapon non-use. And this research shows that Just War norms can fill that void.
Admittedly, further testing is necessary but the results at this time are positive and useful in
policy creation and prediction. Thus, there is tentatively a means of making sense of the
oscillations, mobilizations, threats, rule breaking and rule following that makes up the complex
history of the radiological, biological and chemical unconventional weapons.
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